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The Investment Value of Control Stock
David Cowan Bayne, S.J.*
In early 1973 when Victor Rikling, longtime contr6leur of
Mythical Rikling Sheet and Tube Corporation,1 exacted a $3.45
million "premium" over market from Norton Jarneen and os-
tensibly handed over control, 2 he enunciated the most funda-
mental questions in the complex field of corporate control. Was
this truly a bonus that Jarneen paid to Rikling? Or merely
Jarneen's investment evaluation of the control stock with Jar-
neen in control? Was Rikling simply saying that a control block
has an intrinsic and legitimate value considerably greater than
a similar block without control? Were both maintaining that
they alone, irrespective of the public owners, could determine in
a private sale the "considerably greater" value of that control
block? The answers to these complex queries will form the last
major segment in the philosophy of corporate control.3
MYTHICAL RIKLING
From inauspicious beginnings in 1928, Mythical Rikling had
grown internally and through merger (Dependable Steel) and
acquisitions (Blaine-Spahn Steel, Havensend Steel, Ark-Weld)
to $100-million annual sales in the early seventies.4 By its forty-
fifth year, 1972, MRST offered a wide range of steel products from
pig iron and basic open-hearth steel, hot- and cold-rolled sheets
to high-carbon spring wire and welded-wire fabric to line pipe,
oil-well casing and structural-steel tubing. With four producing
mills and 18 sales offices Mythical Rikling5 had become by
1972 a relatively substantial regional producer ranking just out-
side Fortune's select 500 top industrials.6 The 3.9-million shares
outstanding in the hands of some 11,000 shareholders classified
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
1. This lengthy hypothetical has been concocted to remove any
stigma from the individuals and corporations actually involved.
2. The Wall Street Review, Mar. 27, 1973, at 4, col. 1; Jan. 26,
1975, at 10, col. 1.
3. The germinal principles were first presented in Bayne, A Phi-
losophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 22 (1963).
4. GooDy's INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 563 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
GooDY's].
5. Mythical Rikling Sheet and Tube Corp. Annual Report 14
(1973).
6. Mythical Rikling was just inside Fortune's 500 in the late six-
ties but had dropped out by the early seventies.
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MRST as definitely a widely held corporation.7 No single share-
holder, with the exception of the Rikling interests, owned over
10 percent of the stock.8
But that fiscal year ending just before Rikling's departure
in March 1973 had been a troubled one. Earnings before taxes
showed a disturbing 32-percent drop from $7.9 to $5.3 million,
registering the lowest per-share return in five years, $0.93.9 The
common stock was trading on the NYSE in the midteens, with
a two-million-share turnover in the seven months ending March,
1973.10 The regular dividend of $0.60--down from a dollar in
1965n--provided a below-average return. The firm had "been
the subject of takeover rumors for months. On Feb. 29 Alabama-
Atlantic Corp., Portland, Me., producer of building materials and
paper, called off merger talks with Mythical Rikling.'u 2 But the
rumors persisted. A spring management shuffle saw the ap-
pointment of a new treasurer, the realignment of six vice presi-
dents and the replacement-after 44 years with the company-
of the president Val Florian with Edward A. Harper s who came
with the 1969 acquisition of Ark-Weld, Incorporated.14
This was the gloomy panorama that Victor Rikling could so
clearly discern from his Tribune Tower aerie. And he equally
clearly wanted out. With astonishing speed-as late as March
8, 1973, the Annual Report still carried Mr. Rikling's remark:
"Currently we are exploring, with Alabama-Atlantic Corp., the
benefits . . .if the two companies are merged"'15-he got what
7. GooDY's, supra note 4, at 5.
8. Mythical Rikling Sheet and Tube Corp. Proxy Statement,
March 17, 1974; United States Securities and Exchange Commission,
Official Summary of Security Transactions and Holdings, Vol. 38-39
(1972-77).
9. Mythical Rikling Sheet and Tube Corp. Annual Report 9(1972) [hereinafter cited as Annual Report].
10. GooDY's, supra note 4. The volune for these months was un-
doubtedly increased appreciably by the frequent rumors of mergers and
takeovers. The following is a rough capitulation:
September 1972 384,700
October 1972 179,300
November 1972 117,900
December 1972 455,200
January 1973 388,600
February 1973 312,300
March 1973 293,100
11. GooDY's, supra note 4. 2,131,100
12. Supra note 2.
13. Annual Report, supra note 9, at 6.
14. Goonv's, supra note 4.
15. Annual Report, supra note 9, at 3. The date discrepancy with
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he wanted. A short 26 days after the Alabama-Atlantic call-off
came the startling announcement:
NEW YORK-European Import Companies, Inc. has pur-
chased blocks of stock in Mythical Rikling Sheet and Tube Corp.
and Bonus Pig Iron, Ltd. from Victor Rikling, the Chicago fi-
nancier, and one of his associates for about $19,040,000.
It marks a major withdrawal from the Midwest steel and
iron ore industry of the 72-year-old Mr. Rikling, chairman of
the Narragansett and Maine Lines. The other seller of the stocks
was James R. Weakly, long associated with Mr. Rikling in wide-
spread business ventures.
European Import paid them $25 a share for 525,000 shares,
or about 13% of the outstanding share of Mythical Rikling Sheet
and Tube Corp., a steel producer.16
European Import Companies, Incorporated, Norton Jarneen
contr~leur, is the parent of European Import Railroad, a major
rail company until recently subsidized by the federal govern-
ment.17 "European Import has acquired at least three other
companies within the past year."' 8
Since Mythical Rikling shares had been struggling along
for the month prior to the Rikling-Jarneen deal in a range from
16-3/4 to 20-1/819 Jarneen paid $4.875 to $8.25 over market-a 24-
the Wall Street Review release is explained by advance preparation
of the annual report for printing.
16. Supra note 1.
17. Id.
18. Id. Apparently control of Chicago-Slopes Iron Co. was also ac-
quired through the control of Mythical Rikling.
19. The following conspectus tells a story in itself. The dates are
for trading, not reporting, and run Monday through Friday.
Date Volume Closing
February 26, 1973 4700 203/4
February 27, 1973 4000 20 3/4
February 28, 1973 8000 20 5/8
February 29, 1973 6500 20 1/8
("On Feb. 29 Alabama-Atlantic Corp.
... called off merger talks. The Wall
Street Review, Mar. 27, 1973, at 4,
col. 1.)
March 1, 1973 26600 18 1/8
March 4, 1973 17700 17 1/4
March 5, 1973 8900 16 3/4
March 6, 1973 16700 18 3/4
March 7, 1973 5300 18 7/8
March 8, 1973 5900 18 1/8
March 11 1973 7600 18 1/2
March 12, 1973 18200 19 3/8
March 13, 1973 22900 20 1/8
March 14, 1973 15600 193/4
March 15, 1973 9800 19 1/4
March 18, 1973 6400 19 1/2
March 19, 1973 8300 18 7/8
March 20 1973 3100 19 3/8
March 21 1973 17400 19 3/4
March 22, 1973 9300 19 7/8
MINNESOTA LAW" REVIEW
to 49-percent markup--for a total premium. ranging from $2.6
to $4.3 million,20 averaging out at $3.45 million. The spread for
calendar 1972 was 22-1/8 to 11-1/4.21 For 1971 20 to 11-1/4.22
The 1972 earnings figure would have netted Mr. Jarneen a 3.7-
percent return on his investment.
The immediate upshot was predictable: "Norton Jarneen,
president of European Import, and [his brother-in-law] Egbert
E. Setting, Jr., vice president of European Import, replace Mr.
Rikling and Mr. Weakly as directors ... ,,23 This left the
seven-man board with two remaining Rikling nominees, Louis
L. King, an attorney and "Vice President-Assistant to Presi-
dent" of the company, and Young D. Speydi, an outside director,
in addition to Mr. Harper, Mr. Florian and Curt A. Yocum, "Vice
President-Finance. 24
The plan took another step forward at the 1974 annual meet-
ing: A third Jarneen man, Robert H. Holman, Chairman of
Jarneen-dominated Circulator Corporation, replaced Curt Yo-
cum. James E. Hullen, Jr. from the Harper-Ark-Weld days
succeeded Val Florian who did not stand for reelection.25
But Hullen's days were numbered. He did not fit into the
final scheme of things, which jelled in early 1975 with the addi-
tion of the fourth Jarneen director on the seven-man board.
With Hullen's demise came a presage of Mr. Harper's future
and further bleak news of MRST profits and dividends:
YOUNGSTOWN-Ailing Mythical Rikling Sheet and Tube
Corp. elected Lewis L. Singer, former chairman, president and
chief executive officer of Regional Materials Services Ltd. [a
March 25, 1973 20600 20 1/2
March 26, 1973 73200 20 3/4("European Import Purchases Stock
From Victor Rilding." The Wall Street
Review, Mar. 27, 1973, at 4, col. 1.)
March 27, 1973 18400 20 1/4
March 28, 1973 7900 19 1/2
March 29, 1973 5600 19 1/220. The premium figure of $3.45 million is arbitrary. Later analy-
sis will establish guidelines for the determination of the correct amount
of such a premium. This $3.45 million, moreover, does not include a
second premium paid by Jarneen to Ved Florian, the former MRST
president, for his 197,465 shares. The Wall Street Review, Feb. 13, 1974,
at 20, col. 3. Nor is any possible premium paid for Bonus Pig Iron, Ltd.
under discussion.
21. GooDY's, supra note 4.
22. Id.
23. The Wall Street Review, supra note 2.
24. Annual Report, supra note 9, at 2.
25. Proxy Statement, supra note 8.
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Jarneen company], to the new position of chairman of the exec-
utive committee. He was also named a director.
Mr. Singer will replace on the board James E. Hullen, Jr.
who will remain vice president of Mythical Rikling. Mr. Hullen
may possibly rejoin an expanded board in April.
Edward A. Harper remains president and chief executive
officer of the steel company.
Mythical Rikling's earnings plunged 88.4% to $405,000, or 10
cents a share, in the first nine months of 1974 from $3.5 million,
or 88 cents a share, a year earlier. Sales fell 10.7% to $83.8
million from $93.9 million. The company also omitted its third
quarter dividend after paying 15 cents quarterly since 1967.26
Short days later the Review gave the final fillip-the 1974 re-
sults:
YOUNGSTOWN-Mythical Rikling Sheet and Tube Corp.
reported a $176,000 loss in the fourth quarter ... worse than a
$131,000 loss in the like 1973 period,...
Earnings for the year dropped sharply to $229,000, or six
cents a share, from $3.4 million, or 85 cents a share in 1968....
Edward A. Harper, president, said the year's profit decrease
"was the result of unsatisfactory operations at the Havensend
(Ohio) plant, including two major equipment failures and a
fire....),27
Thus did the 1973 transfer of control of Mythical Rikling
see its implementation in measured steps over a two-year period.
THE ISSUE DRAWN
Victor Rikling's questions have been vexing courts and com-
mentators ever since the turn of the century. Two opposing
schools-so antipolar in their convictions as to excite wonder
at the gulf between them-have steadfastly confronted each
other throughout the entire period. Certainly no acceptable
resolution of the conflict has been found down to the present.
At one far pole stands the Court of Appeals of New York.
In the 1899 case, the famous McClure v. Law,28 the court posed
the problem: "The question is therefore presented whether the
defendant is bound to account for the money received from
Levy for the transfer to him and his associates of the manage-
ment and control of the Life Union, together with its property
and effects. '29 In answering its own question the New York
court had resort to Perry on Trusts-and thus added its sup-
port to the then-current movement toward a trust foundation
26. The Wall Street Review, Jan. 26, 1975, at 10, col. 1.
27. The Wall Street Review, Feb. 17, 1975, at 13, col. 4.
28. 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
29. Id. at 80, 55 N.E. at 389.
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for the control philosophy-in its paraphrase of the prototypal
control case of 1856, Sugden v. CrossZand:3 0 "'So, where a
trustee retired from the office in consideration that his successor
paid him a sum of money, it was held that the money so paid
must be treated as a part of the trust estate, and that the trustee
must account for it as he could make no profit directly or in-
directly from the trust property or from the position or office
of trustee.'-"1 The 1940 federal case, Insuranshares Corpora-
tion v. Northern Fiscal Corporation, ' had a similar view of the
matter:
The defendants have insisted throughout the case that the
transfer ... was simply a sale of stock, the passing of control
being merely a normal concomitant, and most of their argument
was based upon this premise. This view, however, I think is
fundamentally wrong. If the whole record be read, I do not see
how the transaction can be considered as anything other than a
sale of control, to which the stock sale was requisite, but
nevertheless a secondary matter.33
Thus the Insuranshares court would countenance no such deal
between the contr6leurs. "The buyers were primarily interested
in getting control of the corporation together with such stock
ownership as would make that control secure and untrammelled,
and the sellers were primarily interested in getting as much
money as possible for what they had to sell-both the control and
their interest in the assets. '3 4 A year later Gerdes v. Reynolds3 i
in New York confirmed Insuranshares: "Neither can they ac-
cept pay in any form or guise, direct or devious, for their own
resignation or for the election of others in their place."36  Ex-
pectably the Second Circuit in Perlman v. Feldmann37 repro-
bated the control premium:
We do not mean to suggest that a majority stockholder can-
not dispose of his controlling block of stock to outsiders with-
out having to account to his corporation for profits.... But
when the sale necessarily results in - . . unusual profit to the
fiduciary ... he should account for his gains.
The case will therefore be remanded to the district court for
30. Sugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (Ch. 1856).
31. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 81, 53 N.E. 388, 389 (1899).
32. 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
33. Id. at 24.
34. Id.
35. 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
36. Id. at 651.
37. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). For a thorough analysis of this
famous case, see Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Disposi-
tion, 57 CALIm. L. REv. 615 (1969).
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a determination of . . . the value of defendants' stock without
the appurtenant control .... 38
That was in 1955. By 1964, the McClure tradition was still vigor-
ous. In that year the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the
Supreme Court's pungent analysis of the sale-of-control prem-
ium in Caplan v. Lionel:39
When the transaction is stripped of its somewhat compli-
cated facade, what was originally offered by Cohn, and in turn
subsequently offered for sale by Defiance, was Cohn's power
which later became Defiance's power ... to "persuade" seven
out of ten of the board of directors of Lionel to resign in favor
of the designees of any prospective purchasers of such power.
Clearly, such power alone was the commodity here being
bartered to the highest bidder in the marketplace.40
The celebrated Lionel opinions41 are probably the best modern
spokesmen for this antipolar extreme. Ferraioli v. Cantor,42 a
1967 federal case, and both Brown v. Halbert 3 and Jones v.
Ahmanson 4 in 1969 in California follow the McClure tradition.
But the convictions at the other pole are equally cate-
gorical. An early instance out of many again came from New
York in the fascinating Stanton v. Schenk45 in 1931 (Mr. Nicholas
Schenk just recently deceased was one of the "leads" in a true-
life drama featuring Marcus Loew of the threatre chain, his
widow, William Fox of Fox Theatres, and MGM). As with Mc-
Clure, Schenk issued a forthright statement of the question:
Essentially the sole proposition in this case is whether or not
a person who, because of his position as an officer and director
of a corporation, is enabled to sell his shares of stock at a
much larger price than the stock would bring in the open mar-
ket, is bound to turn that profit back into the treasury of the
corporation .... 46
The answer was equally forthright and equally contra
McClure:
No one will argue that the holder of a large block of the stock
38. 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955).
39. 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1964).
40. Matter of Lionel Corp., 151 N.Y.L.J. at 14, col. 3, at col. 5
(Feb. 4, 1964).
41. Id., aff'd sub nom., Petition of Caplan, 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246
N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d
877 (1964). Gabriel Indus., Inc. v. Defiance Indus., Inc., 151 N.Y.L.J. 13,
col. 8 (Sup. Ct. June 17, 1964) (Serafite, J.), aff'd mem., 23 App. Div.
2d 630, 260 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1965), modified, 22 N.Y.2d 405, 239 N.E.2d 706,
293 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1968).
42. 281 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
43. 271 Cal. App. 2d 307, 76 Rptr. 781 (1969).
44. Jones v. Ahmanson, - Cal. App. 2d - (1969).
45. 140 Misc. 621, 251 N.Y.S. 221 (1931).
46. Id. at 216, 251 N.Y.S. at 229.
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of a corporation would be under a dut-y to account for his profit
to the corporation. As such holder he might be in a position
to command a considerable premium above the current prices
in a favorable market. The advantage would be entirely his,
for which he would in no way be compelled to respond to the
corporation. 47
In 1960, in Manacher v. Reynolds48 Chancellor Seitz sitting
as the Court of Chancery of Delaware confirmed the Schenk
court when he endorsed the position of a Reynolds' "expert wit-
ness, Mr. Brandi, president of Dillon, Reed & Co., Inc., a well
known investment house."
49
"A. I think control of a corporation is practically always worth
more than the market value of an ordinary share.
"Q. Have you formed any opinion as to how much more?
A. Well, I believe that you could readily obtain forty to fifty
million dollars in excess of break-up value for the rights to
control Reynolds Metals.
"The Court: Just to be explicit, when you talk of this value,
it is a value to whom?
"The Witness: Value to a willing buyer, buying from a willing
seller .... [S]omeone who would wamt to go into this business
and buy control of it."50
The lower court in Feldmann was unabashedly clear: "It is
obvious, I think, that some at least of the specific applications
of the power [of control] have inherent value effective to en-
hance the value of a control block of the stock."51 Judge Nord-
bye in Honigman v. Green Giant Company52 in the District
Court of Minnesota has taken probably the most unequivocal
stand of all: "No Class A shareholder could be expected to
forego the power of control of a company of this size without
receiving in return a consideration commensurate with the value
of the control which he foregoes. '53 One year later, 1962, the
Second Circuit in Essex Universal v. Yates5 4 carried forward
the tradition. "There is no question of the right of a controlling
shareholder under New York law normally to derive a premium
from the sale of a controlling block of stock."5 5 In the most re-
cent and most direct confrontation, the Tenth Circuit in the
1969 case of McDaniel v. Painter5 fully endorsed Christophides
47. Id. at 216, 251 N.Y.S. at 223.
48. 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741 (1960).
49. Id. at 420, 165 A.2d at 752.
50. Id.
51. Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Conn. 1952).
52. 208 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1961).
53. Id. at 758.
54. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
55. Id. at 576.
56. 418 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1969).
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v. Porco57 and thus summarized the apparent trend. Federal
District Court Judge Pollack in 1968 in Porco could not have been
clearer:
Even assuming that Fasco realized a premium for its con-
trolling block, that alone would not entitle plaintiffs to relief.
Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, . . . Manacher v. Reynolds
.... These cases hold that a majority or controlling stock-
holder is under no duty to other stockholders to refrain from
receiving a premium upon the sale of his stock which reflects
merely the control potential of that stock. There is no obligation
under such circumstances to "share and share alike."58
But probably the loudest voice and the most impressive author-
ity is Judge Swan of the Second Circuit in his forceful dissent
in Feldmann: "Concededly a controlling block of stock has
greater sale value than a small lot."5 9 In response to the major-
ity's remand "for a determination of... the value of defendants'
stock without the appurtenant control .... "60 Judge Swan elab-
orated his position:
The controlling block could not by any possibility be shorn of
its appurtenant power to elect directors .... It is this "ap-
purtenant power" which gives a controlling block its value as
such block. What evidence could be adduced to show the value
of the block "if shorn" of such appurtenant power, I cannot con-
ceive, for it cannot be shorn of it.61
So, seemingly, are the two warring camps drawn up against
each other. This ambivalence in the law of corporate control is
frustratingly summarized in a single mugwumpian sentence
in Lionel.
Nor may controlling stockholders receive a bonus or premium
specifically in consideration of their agreement to resign and
install the designees of the purchaser of their stock, above
and beyond the price normally attributable to the control stock
being sold.6 2
Thus is the scene set for the answer to Mr. Rikling's questions.
57. 289 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
58. Id. at 405.
59. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 1955).
60. Id. at 178.
61. Id. at 180. A legal writer supports Swan:
The control potential of a large block of shares has a value,
and equalizing per-share prices is simply interfering with the
market forces determining the value of control. As the price
of control blocks is raised in this artificial fashion, fewer "pur-
chases" of control will occur. Many shareholders will simply
receive no premium at all for their shares-a high price to pay
for shareholder equality.
Manne, Letter to the Editor, The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 5, 1969, at
22, col. 6.
62. Matter of Lionel Corp., 151 N.Y.L.J. 14, col. 3, at col. 4 (Feb. 4,
1964). (emphasis added).
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"Is the price paid in reality a price paid for the stock, or is it, in
part at least, a price paid for the resignations of the existing
officers and directors and the election of the buyer's nomi-
nees?" 63 And, if 'a price paid for the stock,' does the right rest
in Rikling and Jarneen to set such price without regard to the
market of the 87-percent minority?
The answers will be approached in a Prelude and four parts:
(1) Contr6leur Increment and True investment Value, (II) The
Disqualification of the Contr6leurs, (Ill) The Solution: The
Tender Offer, (IV) The Legal Consequences of a Sale.
THE PRELUDE
The gradual evolution of the philosophy of corporate con-
trol has been speeded considerably by meticulous definition of
the major control concepts.64 Fuzziness can ruin an analysis.
An initial chore, therefore, must be the isolation by precise de-
lineation of each of the two concepts fundamental to the present
study: (1) The Legitimate Transfer of Control, (2) The Sale-of-
Control Premium-Bribe.
(1) THE LEGITIMATE TRANSFER OF CONTROL
The point of reference for any recondite control problem
logically should be the simple control transfer, unencumbered
by the complexities of premiums over market, subtle investment-
value factors or devious camouflages of collateral consideration.
In a word, the ancient reductio ad absurdum inevitably facilitates
comparison with involved variants and hybrids.
Just such an apposite reductio was the unassuming trans-
fer in 1964 of Weyenberg Shoe 65 from Patriarch Weyenberg-
at age 82, founder, director and contr6leur for all of the firm's
58 years-to Thomas W. Florsheim, young, in his midthirties,
"vigorous, and with nearly five years experience as vice-presi-
dent of the Florsheim Division of *International Shoe ... ."66
As contr6leur, Weyenberg was acutely conscious of his fiduciary
63. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 653 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
64. Bayne, The Definition of Corporate Control, 9 ST. Lois U.L.J.
445 (1965); Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53
Mixx. L. REv. 485 (1969), reprinted in 11 CoRPoRATE PRACTICE COMMEN-
TATOR 139 (1969).
65. Bayne, A Legitimate Transfer of Control: The Weyenberg
Shoe-Florsheim Case Study, 18 STAN. L. REV. 438 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Weyenberg].
66. Id. at 440.
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duties to his highly successful company, realizing full well that
the destiny of Weyenberg Shoe lay cupped in his own two hands
-through his family and himself he controlled exactly 51.3 per-
cent of the company's stock.67 He further recognized that such
absolute custody 8 carried the imminent obligation to seek out
and appoint the best possible successor to the office of contr6leur.
All other of his corporate acts were as nothing compared to this
choice of a new man for the top job. His sole concern: Succes-
sor suitability.
Mr. Weyenberg had been early convinced that "Florsheim
possessed all the requisite leadership qualities, from a prestige
name and social acceptability to managerial competence and
moral integrity."69 Further to the point, "Et]he death of R. J.
Dempsey had left the firm bereft of a president, with no dis-
cernible heirs to the leadership. '70
But how effect the control transfer? Especially, how could
Florsheim be assured of untrammeled control in the face of
numerous Weyenberg relatives and the 51.3-percent Weyenberg
block?
The solution came in a dissipation of the shares. Approxi-
mately 2,050 public shareholders already held 431,821 shares of
common, the remaining 48.7 per cent of the Weyenberg stock-
If this dispersal were increased substantially, the control of
Weyenberg Shoe would shift from a 51.3 per cent "democratic
majority" to a "mere-incumbency" control through the domi-
nation of the proxy statement.71
Just such a dispersal was effected through the secondary offer-
ing of 222,725 shares of the Weyenberg family stock. This left a
23.2-percent block in Mr. Weyenberg and the bulk, 73.8 percent,
scattered across the nation among thousands of shareholders.72
Florsheim thus became contr6leur of Weyenberg Shoe.
"To give stability and permanency to his affiliation, Flor-
sheim further agreed to invest 600,050 dollars in the company
through the purchase of 27,275 shares of common stock at twenty-
two dollars per share.17 3 On the two days prior to the agree-
67. Id.
68. See Bayne, Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee, 53 GEO. L.J.
543 (1965).
69. Weyenberg, supra note 65, at 440; Bayne, The Sale of Corporate
Control, 33 FoRDAm L. REv. 583, 593 (1965).
70. Weyenberg, supra note 65, at 439.
71. Id. at 440.
72. Id. at 441.
73. Id. at 440.
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ment Weyenberg Shoe closed at 22-7/8 on the American Stock
Exchange.7 4
In the secondary offering the price to the public was $24.25 per
share, with $22.80 the proceeds to the selling shareholders (the
last reported Amex sale on October 14, 1964, was $24.375). Thus
Florsheim, at $22.00 exactly, paid an amount slightly lower
than the going market and less than the $22.80 received by
Weyenberg and his associates after deduction of underwriting
discounts and commissions from the public price.75
Mr. Weyenberg without more had simply sold some 27,000 of
his own shares at market, undoubtedly conscious, even overly
conscious, of the trust relationship he bore through the firm to
the many members of his family and the public, who assuredly
would be shocked at any bonus over market. Note well, more-
over, only one assumption will give legitimacy to the Weyenberg-
Florsheim stock sale: That the price paid was in effect set by
the impartial public fully informed of Florsheim and his potential
for the future of Weyenberg Shoe.
The Weyenberg-Florsheim transfer was just as simple as
that. No beclouding factors hid the essentials from view. Con-
tr6leur Weyenberg appointed Florsheim his successor, and inci-
dentally sold him three percent of Weyenberg Shoe at market.
(2) TiE SALE-OF-CONTROL PREMIUM-BRBE
Perhaps the most advanced development in the philosophy
of corporate control has come in the area of the illegitimate sale
of control.7 6 If anything is clear-and it clearly is not the
legitimate investment-value rationale-it is the sale-of-control
premium-bribe. Segregate and understand this concept and suc-
cess in understanding the investment value of control stock is
largely assured.
The early sale-of-control cases, McClure, Porter v. Healy,77
Gerdes v. Reynolds-the progenitors of Feldmann, Lionel, Fer-
raioli v. Cantor, Brown v. Halbert, Jones v. Ahmanson-offered
utter simplicity of facts, and resultant clarity of law. Out-
standing of these is Gerdes v. Reynolds.
Single-handed the Reynolds (Metals) family have been pro-
lific of voluminous control litigation. Their first assay into the
74. Id. at 449.
75. Id.
76. Bayne, The Definition, supra note 64, at 485; Bayne, The Sale-
of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic Illegitimacy, 47 TEXAs L. REV. 215
(1969).
77. 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914).
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barter of control came in late 1937 with the sale down the river
of their own Reynolds Investing Company, Incorporated. (In
a similar ploy some 20 years later they were successful, 8 but
in Reynolds they got caught.)
Three Reynoldses (and a factotum by the name of Wood-
ward) were the sole officers and directors of this small invest-
ment trust. "They were also stockholders, and, with members
of their families, owned a majority of its common stock, which
was the only stock having voting power and was junior to de-
bentures and preferred stock outstanding in the hands of the
public."79
A rather nondescript syndicate of ill-defined numbers
headed by Sartell Prentice of the brokerage firm of Prentice &
Brady cast covetous eyes on the liquid portfolio of Reynolds
Investing.. After complicated, even confusing, negotiations over
many weeks the Reynolds family unloaded their entire interest
in the firm, some 1,055,000 shares, for the stunning (as will be
seen) price of $2 per share.80
As the event would have it, John Gerdes, trustee in bank-
ruptcy, instituted an action "to hold accountable therefor both
those who sold and those who bought."81 Justice Walter of the
Supreme Court, New York, in a lengthy opinion concluded:
In this case, however, it indisputably was a condition of the sale
that all the officers and directors then in office should forth-
with resign and that under their power to fill vacancies they
should forthwith elect an entirely new directorate chosen wholly
by the purchaser of the stock .... 82
Moreover, "Neither can they accept pay in any form or guise, di-
rect or devious, for their own resignation or for the election of
others in their place. McClure v. Law . . .; Bosworth v. Allen
"88
At this point the New York court faced up to the question
of segregating the premium-bribe from the investment value of
the block: "Is the price paid in reality a price paid for the stock,
or is it, in part at least, a price paid for the resignations of the
existing officers and directors and the election of the buyer's
78. Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741 (1960).
79. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 629 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
80. Id. at 631.
81. Id. at 630.
82. Id. at 651.
83. Id. See also Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E. 163(1901). The illegality of a premium for control alone has been treated
in Bayne, The Noninvestment Value of Control Stock, 45 IND. L. J. -
(1970).
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nominees?"84 In his answer Justice Walter weighed the rele-
vant factors in stock evaluation and summarized his position.
Viewing all the elements which the fiduciary obligations of
the officers and directors of Reynolds Investing Company re-
quired them to view I am convinced that $2,110,000 was so
grossly in excess of the value of the stock that it carried upon
its face a plain indication that it was not for the stock alone
but partly for immediate en masse resignations and immediate
election of the purchasers' nominees as successors. The trans-
action was not one in which there was merely a sale of stock,
with the right to elect directors passing to the purchasers as a
legal incident of the sale .... 85
The court personally was convinced that six cents per share-
not $2-should be the "maximum asset value of the shares."8 0
But for slightly specious reasons an "additional something" was
allowed "because of permissible hopes and expectations and
other considerations already mentioned. 8 7 With that Justice
Walter disposed of the matter:
It nevertheless is a matter of fact which the trier of facts must
find, and with due allowance for all elements I think that 75
cents per share is as liberal a finding as the evidence warrants.
That gives $791,250 as the price paid for 1,055,000 shares of
stock and $1,318,750 as the price paid for the resignations of the
officers and directors and their elect.on of the buyer's nominees
as their successors, or, in other words for what is termed the
turning over of control.
The conclusion ordinarily to be drawn from the foregoing is
that, having violated their fiduciary duty, these officers and
directors must account to the corporation .. . for the sum of
$1,318,750 .... 8.
And that was the very conclusion that the court reached. As
will be seen, Justice Walter failed to carry the reasoning far
enough, but his total effort was commendable, especially for his
times.
The Premium-Bribe Analyzed
Arguably and in practical effect the court, with McClure,
"treated this transaction as a bribe paid to the directors."8 9 Step
by step through page after page the New York court deftly rea-
soned to all the essential elements of that McClure sale-of-con-
trol premium-bribe. The congeries of these essential elements
84. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 653 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
85. Id. at 658.
86. Id. at 655.
87. Id. at 658.
88. Id. at 658-59.
89. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 80, 55 N.E. 388, 389 (1899).
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leaves only one conclusion, that the $1.3 million-$1.25 per share
over market-was
(1) some form of consideration monetary or otherwise, (2)
flowing to the incumbent contr8leur, (3) from or on behalf
of the prospective contr~leur, (4) to induce the appointment to
the office of control, (5) paid knowingly, scienter.9o
This, of course, is the technical definition of the sale-of-control
premium-bribe.
What the court did not spell out-understandably so in the
early year of 1941-was the underlying rationale for the illegal-
ity of this premium-bribe.9 1 Undeniably, the court founded
its decision on the correct philosophical base. "Officers and di-
rectors always and necessarily stand in a fiduciary relation to
the corporation and to its stockholders .... ',92 However, a long
line of arduous and involved reasoning lies between this broad
fiduciary duty and the $1.3-million award to the corporation. But
this arduous line nonetheless was clearly traced, albeit sublim-
inally, throughout the court's analysis. Necessarily, all three
essentials-perversion of judgment, illicit compensation, unsuit-
able successor-were there.
Perversion of Judgment
First and foremost, throughout the opinion the court con-
tinually adverted to the Reynoldses' specific fiducial obligation
to scrutinize closely the personal suitability of their appointees,
to guarantee honest and competent successors. The court fur-
ther knew that any money under the table was illicit, that such
emolument belonged to the corporation, not to the Reynoldses.
"Neither can they accept pay in any form or guise, direct or
devious, for their own resignation or for the election of others in
their place."93 The violation of these two principles spelled only
one thing: perversion of judgment. Once determined to leave
the firm, the Reynoldses had only one norm governing their
appointment, the suitability of the successor. At that charged
moment in the beginning when they undertook the custody of
Reynolds Investing, they also dedicated themselves unreservedly
to the bonum commune of the company, especially in that most
important official act of all, the appointment of a new con-
tr6leur.
90. Bayne, The Definition, supra note 64, at 497.
91. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium, supra note 76, at 223.
92. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 651 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
93. Id.
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Full in the face of this sole norTL of contr6leur conduct they
turned their back on the corporation-and any thought of suc-
cessor suitability-and founded their judgment of selection on
considerations of cold cash. In a word, here was a $1.3-million
(at least) perversion of judgment in the appointment of Prentice
to the control of Reynolds Investing.
Syllogistically: (1) The suitability of the successor is the sole
final cause that may flow legitimately into the selection of the
new contr6leur. (2) The consideration of the premium-bribe is
totally irrelevant, foreign, antagonistic to suitability. (3) Yet
the premium-bribe consideration does flow as a final cause into
the selection of a successor. Here is the quintessence of the
perversion.94
Illicit Consideration
But the illegitimacy of the premium-bribe does not stop with
the perversion of the contr6leur's judgment. Even beyond this,
the Reynolds family accepted, even demanded, $1.3 million for a
corporate act, the most important of their corporate career, per-
formed "in fulfillment of a corporate duty, in the course of of-
ficial business, during the regular workweek, for which [they
were] already amply remunerated." 5 The acceptance and the
attempted retention of this $1.3 million was in and of itself a
second distinct element of the total turpitude of the premium-
bribe. Here was illicit emolument that rightly belonged to the
corporation. Here, moreover, was the direct rationale for the
court's award of the $1.3 million to the corporation.
Successor Unsuitability
Thirdly and most subtly, and a pcsint which seemed to flicker
in the back of the court's head, was the last coconstituent of the
overall illegitimacy of the premium-bribe. The Reynolds family
knew full well that the Prentice group were bribers, men (1)
prepared to pervert the Reynolds judgment to the tune of $1.3
million, and (2) prepared to pay this illicit cash not to the cor-
poration but to faithless servants. Knowing all this the Rey-
noldses were nevertheless determined to foist such unsuitable
men on the hapless firm. Thus, premium-bribe-induced unsuit-
ability was also a factor in the illegality.
The amalgam of these three elements is the essential turpi-
tude of the premium-bribe.
94, Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium, supra note 76, at 223.
95. Id. at 235.
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This tripartite illegitimacy could be described as (1) the per-
version of the judgment of the incumbent contr~leur, en-
gendered by an appointment of a successor induced by a cause
other than suitability, (2) that is, for consideration illicit in
itself, (3) resulting in the appointment of a candidate unsuitable
by reason of his own role in the inducement. 96
Set off against the legitimate control transfer of Weyenberg
Shoe, Gerdes v. Reynolds can serve as the archetype of the
illegitimate sale-illicit dollars improperly paid to the contr6leur
to premium-bribe an unsuitable successor into the office.
(I) CONTROLEUR INCREMENT AND TRUE
INVESTMENT VALUE
With these two antithetical prototypes so stark and clear-
one patently legitimate, the other not-what must be said of the
elusive and unidentified tertium quid? Judge Swan-and cer-
tainly Victor Rikling-had something else in mind beyond the
simple transfer of control without bonus or markup, and surely
not the bald premium-bribe of Reynolds. Prescinding from the
pro or con, what are the basic factors-and what are not-that
contribute to the presence of a legitimate investment value in a
"control" block of stock? Before arguing to its legitimacy, first
define it precisely, then view the definition from every reasonable
angle.
One further admonition is in order. For the present, pre-
scind further from the later, and completely crucial, question of
who has the ultimate right-the negotiating contr6leurs, the
market, the minority shareowners-to establish "the investment
value" of the "control" stock. For now, simply define what it is.
For later, the who is to evaluate, how, and under what rules.
Technically defined:
The Legitimate Investment Value of Control Stock is the total
current worth of that stock, (1) resultant on the superadded
contribution of the estimable abilities of a new contr~leur to
(2) the existent corporate entity.
Toward understanding this elusive concept, one surpassing
truth can summarily brush away a long series of misconceived
premises. A new man with fresh and different talents has just
succeeded to the top spot in the corporate heirarchy. This ap-
pointment is nothing other than a transfer of control, and this
transfer has brought a new set of assets to the firm. The incre-
ment referable to the qualities of this new contrleur-the new
96. Id. at 222.
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value a new contr6leur adds to the otherwise-unchanged corpo-
ration-is the all-important element in the investment value of
control stock. Here is the preeminent fact in the concept.
Thus certainly this new value is not related to a sale of
control, the barter of the office, which entails a premium-bribe
and is intrinsically illegitimate. The -value does not lie in control
as such, but rather in the totality of the abilities the new man
brings to the firm. The possession of control merely facilitates
the exercise of the talents. The totality of his suitability is the
differential between the value of the corporation before and af-
ter arrival, under a former control vis A vis a new control.
"Control" was always present. New talents made the difference.
A direct ratio persists between these abilities and the investment
value of the control stock.
A second source of distortion has been the use of the term
"control stock." The implication would seem to be that the in-
vestment value is limited exclusively to the control block. To
the contrary, the accession of the new contr6leur benefits the
entire entity and correspondingly enhances equally the value of
all the stock outstanding-including, incidentally, the "control
block."
The explanation of this usage of "control block" is not diffi-
cult to discern. Although the increment to the entity attributable
to the special talents of the new contr6leur is not peculiarly
related to the "control block," nonetheless an accidental con-
nection often exists between the new contrleur-the party re-
sponsible for the increment-and the stock. It often happens-
and outstandingly so in control litigation-that the successor
contr6leur purchases a stock block from the incumbent at the
time of the appointment. The price set for this "control stock"
reflects for the first time the increment to the entity resultant
on the new man's worth.
Correctly expressed, therefore, the investment value, en-
hanced by the appointment of the new man, is prorated equally
to all stock of the entity-including, of course, but not ex-
clusively, the "control block" as well. Merely because the owner
of the "control block" happens to be the new contr6leur does
not mean that that stock is any more valuable per share than
the stock owned by anyone else, whether he be the outgoing
contr6leur or a minority public holder. In short, the investment
value is unrelated to who the owner is, and hence unrelated
to the "control block" as such. In fact, ownership as a relevant
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factor would be ignored completely were not some owner, any
owner, necessary.
Thus Judge Swan in his FeZdmann dissent--"Concededly a
controlling block of stock has greater sale value than a small
lot"97-was not only misleading, but probably never meant what
he said. Judge Swan certainly would never condone a premium-
bribe:
A director is privileged to resign, but so long as he remains a
director he must be faithful to his fiduciary duties and must
not make a personal gain from performing them. Conse-
quently, if the price paid for Feldmann's stock included a pay-
ment for voting to elect the new directors, he must account to
the corporation for such payment, even though he honestly
believed that the men he voted to elect were well qualified to
serve as directors. He cannot take pay for performing his
fiduciary duty.9 8
Yet Judge Swan equally definitely recognized a "greater sale
value" in "a controlling block of stock." How maneuver the
Judge between this Scylla and Charybdis? The maneuver is a
statement of what the Judge really meant, and an enunciation
as well as the perspective proper to understanding the true na-
ture of the investment value of "control" stock:
A "controlling block of stock" (or any other block) sold (or
not sold) by the outgoing contr6leur (or by anyone) to his
appointee (or to anyone) has "greater sale value" than "a small
lot" (or any lot, including the "controlling block") had before
the accession of the talented new contr6leur.
Furthermore, this proposition stated in question form would be
the exact and technical question-the first of the two-that Mr.
Rilding asked when Mr. Jarneen handed him $3.45 million over
market: Does the "control block" have an intrinsic and legitimate
value considerably greater than a similar block without control?
The answer to Mr. Rikling's question and to Judge Swan's
quandary should supply a new set of legal principles funda-
mental to the philosophy of corporate control.
THE ELEMENTS OF THE SHARE VALUE
Toward the explication of Judge Swan's statement-as re-
written-recur to the basic Rikling-Jarneen facts. First adapt
them slightly to present purposes, and later use them as they
were.
The time as before is March of 1973. The scene is the same.
97. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 1955).
98. Id. at 179.
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Mr. Rikling atop the Tribune Tower discerns the same gloomy
panorama stretching back over Mythical Rikling's fiscal 1972.
The presage is there. As a "Youngstown source said . . . 'Mr.
Rikling became 72 last December. He has expressed on numer-
ous occasions the desire to liquidate much, if not all, of his
holdings and take it easy."' And again, being a sensible man,
Mr. Rikling had determined to do just that.
Again, being also a conscientious man, Mr. Rikling under-
took a thorough search for a suitable successor as contr6leur of
Mythical Rikling. His first selection did not measure up, or at
any event aborted. Unfortunately, '[o]n Feb. 29 Alabama-At-
lantic... called off merger talks with Mythical Rikling." But
in his second effort Mr. Rikling found his Florsheim in Norton
Jarneen. In him, one could conjecture, were all the "personal
qualities required of the corporate contr6leur ... (1) moral
integrity; (2) intellectual competence; (3) managerial and or-
ganizational proficiency; (4) social suitability; and (5) satis-
factory age and health."99 With this selection Mr. Rikling had
satisfied his trust obligation to Mythical Rikling.
But at this point the script varies. Conceive rather that
Messrs. Rikling and Weakly had over recent years slowly sold
off their 13-percent block of stock. Ex hypothesi, therefore,
MRST shares were completely dispersed. No single shareholder
owned more than three percent and Mr. Rikling himself had
none. His was the merest of mere-incumbency control, but with
all the stability of A. T. & T., thanks to the wide dispersal and
his firm grasp on the proxy-solicitation mechanism.
As for Norton Jarneen, he was an empire builder much in
the mold of a Muscat, a Riklis or a Ling. He wanted no stock,
only the opportunity to put his unparalleled abilities to work
for Mythical Rikling. With the meeting of the minds the deal was
sealed and the appointment made, with nary a share changing
hands. As Insuranshares would put it, "[E]verything they did
[was] done without their owning more than directors' qualifying
shares."'100 The seriatim replacements were perfunctory.
The obvious upshot? The consensus of informed buyers and
sellers, established by the reasoned judgment of the Street,
would shortly respond to Mr. Jarneen's appointment by sending
the market in Mythical Rikling, for exanple, to 25.
99. Bayne, supra note 69, at 593.
100. Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22,
24 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
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TnE PERSON IS THE VALUE
This variation on the original Mythical Rikling facts should
illustrate one principal point. The arrival of a supercontr6leur
can enhance overnight the value of all stock equally-without
any sale whatsoever, whoever the owner. The only requisite:
The transfer of control, the appointment of a new contr6leur.
From the particular aspect of the share value, the crux of
the problem lies with the personal qualifications of the suc-
cessor contr6leur. The differential between a corporation before
and after is the sole distinguishing element. At Mythical Rik-
ling this overnight differential lay between Victor Rikling
and Norton Jarneen, between $18 and $25 per share.
At this point a new technical term could well be introduced
into the argot of corporate control:
Contrbleur Increment is the increase in value of all stock of a
corporation referable exclusively to the proven abilities of a
new contrleur-the differential between the contributions to
corporate value of the outgoing and incoming contr6leur.
This contr6leur increment alone distinguishes the investment
value of "control stock" from the same block prior to the advent
of the new contr6leur. Bearing forcefully in mind all the pre-
cautions of The Prelude, it is fascinating to read Judge Hincks'
mind between the lines of his analysis of the contr6leur incre-
ment in the lower-court Feldmann:
For instance, to the usual minority stockholder in a cor-
poration the value of his stock necessarily depends on earnings
which in turn depend on the abilities of its management. But
one considering the purchase of a control block in a corporation
may give less weight to past earnings since, if a change in
management might be beneficial, the power to make such a
change is in his hands. Thus, where the purchaser feels that
the corporation's past record does not adequately reflect its
realizable possibilities, he may well feel justified in paying
more than the quoted market price for a control block of its
stock, on the theory that the present price probably has been
determined in large measure by the corporate earnings under
the old management. Surely this power through stock control
to improve the corporate performance may be a factor of value
attaching to a control block of stock.101
Whether the new contr6leur is to be an Ernest Breech, a Lynn
Townsend, a Roy D. Chapin, Jr., or rather a Louis Wolfson, a
Lowell Birrell, an Eddie Gilbert, will be the sole intrinsic deter-
minant of the contr~leur increment and correspondingly of the
investment value of the "control block."
101. Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Conn. 1952).
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How does the market discern these personal capabilities of a
Breech or a Birrell? What are the guidelines for the evaluation
of this sole essential of contr~leur increment?
The discernment of the contr6leur increment-and more im-
portant its isolation for evaluation-is not overly difficult. Af-
ter all, the corporation itself necessarily remains unchanged dur-
ing the accession of the new contr6leur, since the appointment
obviously can occur only at a single instant in time. Any
differential must be referable to the new contr6leur's talents.
In such clear isolation the contr6leur increment is readily esti-
mated, and the norms for estimation are simple and obvious.
The Nature of the Firm. As competent an empire builder
as a Jarneen may be, his abilities-and hence the resultant con-
tr6leur increment-must be related to the circumstances he faces.
Thus in the 1956 New York case of Benson v. Braun:02
It is trite but true to say that each corporation whose stock is
evaluated must be viewed in relation to the facts peculiar to
that particular enterprise. In this case factors were present
which could well have been taken into account and have led to
establishing a selling price well above the market quotations
on the corporation's one listed stock.1 03
Even a Rader-Carr would not be invaluable to a Reynolds In-
vesting in the dismal months of late 1937. Who today would
dare pretend to add any contr6leur increment to General Motors?
The current state of the nation, the economic bent of the govern-
ment, the prospects for the industry, the health or infirmity of
the firm itself, all form the milieu in. which the new contr~leur
exercises his talents. The scope for corporate improvement
deeply affects contr6leur potential.
Far from the least of the factors to be considered in assessing
possibilities for growth value is that of management. More-
over, the type of business in which this corporation was en-
gaged is a matter of importance. In the search for reasons
to explain the apparently high price paid for controlling stock,
it is proper to inquire whether there were distinctive features of
the corporation which might influence a purchaser to pay such
price.' 0 4
Past successes, proven ability, vast experience can all be brought
to naught-or enhanced-by these influences. Contr6leur in-
crement, therefore, will fluctuate with the adaptability of the
material at hand and the climate of the environment.
An Informed Market. A key cause for confusion in the
102. 8 Misc. 2d 67, 155 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
103. Id. at 71, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
104. Id. at 72-73, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
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evaluation of contr6leur increment has been the failure to distin-
guish the value of MRST shares under Rikling, for example,
and the wholly new MRST plus Jarneen. The market of MRST
during the entire period prior to the public announcement of
Jarneen's accession could be lower, or higher, than the market
afterwards. More to the point, sufficient time must elapse-
witness the court's treatment of the same problem in Texas Gulf
Sulphur 0L--for the informed public to assimilate the various
effects the Jarneen control will have on Mythical Rikling. Until
all factors necessary for a reasoned judgment have sifted down,
the new market for MRST-plus-Jarneen is not a true norm of the
contr6leur increment. Remember above all that the market for
MRST-plus-Rikling may have little relation to the MRST-plus-
Jarneen market. In fact they could be far apart: By mid-1974,
the Rikling 18 had fallen to a Jarneen 11-3/4.
In the end, the free competitive market-able buyers with
their own money on the line-is the unimpeachable norm. The
market price of a listed stock reflects the full impact of Wall
Street-securities analysts, investment advisers, industry special-
ists, market experts-as well as the "willing seller, willing buyer"
criterion. In fact, the considered judgment of the money-in-
hand investor would be the reliabile distillate of all other value
indices.
This detailed disquisition on the existence and nature of
contr6leur increment-even to the canonization of a new term-
was eminently necessary. Granted, the concept has a relatively
limited use and would appear rarely outside the specific context
of a sale of control. Such circumscribed utility would scarce
warrant such attention had not a long line of Swans, 06 Lum-
bards 07 and Pollacks' 08-and a conjecturally longer line of Rik-
lings and Jarneens-taken refuge in the blind of "true invest-
ment value" of a "control" block of stock. "True investment
value" has long been a ready rebuttal-in fact, the last such
possible rejoinder-to a charge of premium-bribery. And "con-
tr6leur increment" is the heart of "true investment value."
As long as the Swans, therefore, continue to see a "greater
105. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).106. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 1955) (Swan,
J., dissenting).
107. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 576 (2d Cir. 1962)
(Lunbard, C.J.).
108. Christophides v. Porco, 280 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (Pol-
lack, D.J.).
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sale value" in "a controlling block of stock" and the Riklings
persist in thus justifying questionable private sales, one must
thoroughly define their position, if only to reject it out of hand.
The first of Mr. Rikling's questions has thus been answered,
although not perhaps in the full affirmative he expected. A
"control block"-or any block-may have an enhanced value
resultant on the accession of a new contr6leur, the contr6leur
increment. It should be clear, however, that the term "control
stock" is in truth a misnomer.
CONTR6LEUR DECREM=ENT
But stop momentarily. This entire scrutiny of "true invest-
ment value" saw only the rosy half. "Contr6leur decrement"
is a far more realistic factor, especially when a Wolfson or a
Birrell buys control. An incumbent coDntr6leur may be desperate
to retire-through financial pressure, incompetence, age, ennui
-and equally desperate in his selection of a successor. Thus,
perhaps, the overnight value of .ST under Jarneen was
really 11 instead of 25. Maybe the market at 18 for MRST-plus-
Rikling was far too high for the new MRST-plus-Jarneen. In
all the foregoing pages, therefore, also read "contr6leur decre-
ment" and paint the picture black. In every future scrutiny
always ask as well if "contr6leur increment" is not in truth
"decrement," and the investment value that much less. "Con-
tr6leur decrement" is undoubtedly the more important contri-
bution to the control lexicon.
And now, what of the more crucial, second Rikling-Jarneen
question: Who has the right-the two contr6leurs, incoming
and outgoing, the minority 87 percent, the market-to deter-
mine the amount of the contr6leur increment-or decrement-
and hence the true investment value of the "control block?" Or
more to the point, who may act on such an evaluation in a good
hard dollars-and-cents sale of that block? The answers to this
multipronged question will form the second part of this inquiry
into the investment value of control stock.
II. THE DISQUALIFICATION OF THE CONTROLEURS
Return now to the original Mythical Rikling facts. Retrace
each step from the first moment when. Victor Rikling determined
to resign as contr6leur. But pause for a moment at the events
immediately after Mr. Rikling's selection of Mr. Jarneen as his
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successor. Segregate conceptually the various stages of the ne-
gotiations between the two.
At the conclusion of Mr. Rikling's search, and his decision that
Mr. Jarneen embodied every requisite of contr6leur suitability,
the question naturally arose: What of the Rikling 13-percent
block? Should he sell it? After all, with Jarneen in control
the shares could be worth $25 and that was an appreciable in-
crement over the recent market of $18. But if sell it, to whom?
Perhaps the public? Or Val Florian? Or possibly even Mr.
Jarneen himself? Further, reasoned Mr. Rikling, a complete
severance from Mythical Rikling, stock and all, might be the
gentlemanly approach. Even further, the best interests of My-
thical Rikling might dictate a sizable stock ownership in the
new contr6leur himself. Mr. Rikling undoubtedly recalled the
sentiments old man Weyenberg expressed somewhat formally
in his contract with Florsheim:
Whereas Florsheim, having substantial experience in the
business of manufacturing and selling shoes, is willing to under-
take the responsibilities of directing the business and affairs
of the Company in such manner that the ends required by
Weyenberg are achieved, and in connection therewith, wishes to
acquire a substantial equity interest in the company .... 109
As for Mr. Jarneen he shared these thoughts thoroughly, adding
a secret surmise that his control position-founded, it is true, on
the proxy and the dispersal-would certainly not be less secure
with that 13-percent block in hand, rather than the oral, albeit
unquestionable, assurances of Mr. Rikling, or even an unassail-
able voting-trust certificate in his pocket.
With such unanimity of attitude, agreement was readily
reached. Mr. Jarneen was to have his 13-percent block. But
now what? Could Rikling sell Jarneen his own 13 percent forth-
with? If so, at what price? The market had hovered around
18, but both Rikling and Jarneen were convinced--or so it would
seem-that the contr6leur increment resultant on Jarneen in
office actually lifted the value to 25. The two contr6leurs faced
the most vexing of questions: Who is to name the price?
Could they personally set it at 25, and close the sale accordingly?
If ever everything could not be said at once, it is at this
moment when the simultaneous conjunction of several seem-
ingly disparate factors crowds the mind and defies all orderly
progress. But each of these factors can be put in place. And
as each is so arranged, the result becomes an arresting revela-
109. Weyenberg, supra note 65, at 448 (emphasis added).
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tion, especially to Messrs. Rikling aid Jarneen, and any other
sale-negotiating contr~leurs. The orderly conjunction of these
factors spells out forcefully the essential illegality of any private
evaluation of the contrleur increment or decrement by the two
contr~leurs, outgoing and incoming. As a guide for ready
reference, a formal statement of this illegality would perhaps
help toward tracing the line of argumentation:
At the time of the transfer of control and the sale of the
"control" stock inter se, a personal evaluation of that stock-
whether correct or not-by the two contr6leurs, incumbent and
appointee, is intrinsically reprobate %nder the benefit-to-bene-
ficiary and no-inquiry rules, since both contr6leurs are acting
throughout as strict trustees of the entity.
This technical enunciation of the major thesis set for proof should
meet head-on the second of the Rikling-Jarneen questions.
STRIcT TRUSTEES
At this point little doubt should remain about the potential
existence and reality of a marked, dollar differential in value
between a Mythical Rikling under Rikling and the same corpo-
ration moments later under a Jarneen. As for Rikling and
Jarneen they set this overnight contr6leur increment at $25
million, a $3.45-million premium for the 13-percent "control"
block. Less sanguine investors might have seen, to the contrary,
a $25-million contr6leur decrement, with the true market at 11.
No naysayers can gainsay either potential. The question, there-
fore, is not the possibility of some contr6leur increment or de-
crement, but the right and conditions of determining it.
In this direct attack on the personal evaluation by Rikling
and Jarneen, the pervasive philosophical premise, the ultimate
rationale-sufficient with little more-is the custodial concept
of corporate control." 0 In assuming the stewardship of My-
thical Rikling, Victor Rikling promised unqualifiedly all his
"time, energy, imagination, judgment and skill""' to the well-
being and benefit of the corporate entity. As a strict trustee
he was bound firmly by the benefit-to-beneficiary rule. Be-
yond his agreed compensation, no recompense whatsoever could
pass to Mr. Rikling for his transfer of the corporation to Mr.
Jarneen. He was "bound to forego any emolument of any kind
connected with the trust corpus. The very hypothesis of a
trust relationship is the benefit-to-beneficiary rule."" 2 As for
110. Bayne, supra note 68.
111. Id. at 571.
112. Bayne, The Definition, supra note 64, at 510.
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Mr. Jarneen, he too, had undertaken the duties of a strict
trustee. Thus, "at that charged instant when control passes
from contr6leur to appointee, the complete custody of the corpo-
ration hangs precariously in the grasp of each, the one relinquish-
ing, the other assuming."' 13 Both had identical obligations.
THE TRANSFR A!D TE SALE
The first of two highly operable facts along the line of argu-
mentation is the consummated appointment of a new contr6l-
eur. No public announcement has yet been made, but Rikling
has irrevocably selected Jarneen as the new steward of My-
thical Rikling. For all practical purposes complete custody of
the corporation has already passed into Jarneen's hands. Into
these hands has been entrusted the corporate bonum commune,
the future well-being of the entire entity.
The second operable fact has absolutely no intrinsic con-
nection with the first. Whether Victor Rikling is to resign as
contr6leur of Mythical Rikling, no matter. Merely because Rik-
ling has appointed Jarneen his successor, also no matter. In
any case and irrespective of the transfer of control, for reasons
peculiar to each, Rikling has decided to sell and Jarneen to buy
the 13-percent block of "control" stock. Either the control trans-
fer or the stock sale could have been effected separately, the one
without the other.
This essential dichotomy between control transfer and stock
sale is the key to understanding the entire transaction. If Rikling
were to force Jarneen to buy his 13 percent as a condition
precedent to the appointment, any attempt to relate the $3.45
million to the stock would be laughable. Both Rikling and Jar-
neen must staunchly live or die with one assumption: The
appointment of Jarneen was made on merit alone, was a fait
accompli, had absolutely nothing to do with any stock, or a
premium over market, or the payment to Rikling of $3.45 million
in contr6leur increment. With any other assumption Rikling
and Jarneen would be skewered on one prong or the other of a
very painful dilemma. Either Rikling appoints Jarneen for merit
alone, and nothing more, especially nothing more connected with
control-stock dollars, or Rikling wants something more for Jar-
neen's appointment than Jarneen suitability, which by defini-
tion is premium-bribery. The appointment goes with the merit,
the dollars go with the stock. Rikling and Jarneen, therefore,
113. Id.
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must treat the valuation and sale of the stock in utter, albeit
conceptual, isolation from the conceptually prior appointment.
Any other treatment is disastrous.
THE 50-PLus-PERcENT BLOCK
This essential severability may be readily understandable
when the control stock is a minority interest, but the mind
boggles a bit at the prospect of a majority-block sale. When the
incumbent contr6leur owns 50-plus percent of the stock, would
not a transfer of control necessarily entail the simultaneous sale
of the control block? Are not the appointment of the successor
and the stock sale inseparable when the control is actually at-
tached to the stock? To the contrary, the presence of a major-
ity-stock block alters none of the basics. The same fundamental
principles govern the selection of the successor, his appointment
and the transfer of control. One accidental difference, how-
ever, is the understandable cause for hesitation.
In most of the hypotheticals thus far adduced, the control
position of the contr6leur was founded on nondemocratic mere
incumbency, the wide dispersal of shares and the domination
of the proxy-solicitation mechanism. The shift to a majority-
stock-ownership control base only changes one thing, the man-
ner-but not the essentials-of the control transfer. Mr. Weyen-
berg faced this problem in his appointment of Florsheim,
since he owned 51.3 percent of Weyenberg Shoe. He and Flor-
sheim solved the situation not by an outright sale of the block
to Florsheim but by a secondary offering to a widely dispersed
public. Thus, even with a 50-plus-percent block, the sale itself
is unrelated-or related only accidentally-to the transfer of con-
trol. The transfer is the appointment; the sale is collateral at
most. Any of the standard control devices-pooling agreement,
proxy coupled with an interest, voting trust-can achieve the
same objective. Or, of course, the sale of the control block. The
sale is merely one of many means of effecting the appointment,
but in no wise the necessary one.
Although the transactions are essentially unrelated and in-
dependent-as the two contr6leurs must steadfastly aver-never-
theless Rikling and Jarneen have decided to join the two (which
is the invariable case in any but the most bold-faced sales of
control). The simultaneous appointment of a new contr6leur
and the sale of a substantial stock block to the appointee by the
very person appointing melds these two intrinsicaly disparate
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acts into a practically indivisible unit. Any realistic view of the
circumstances makes it impossible to consider one facet without
the other. The two deals are extrinsically inextricable. Future
argument assumes this inseparability.
Another valid assumption would eliminate, and correctly so,
from the Mythical Rikling hypothetical any other collateral
transactions that might divert attention from the control-trans-
fer/stock-sale exchange just now conjoined. Were a substantial
lump sum to have passedn 4-admittedly unconnected with the
stock sale-from Jarneen to Rikling, a rebuttable presumption
of premium-bribe presence 15 would become immediately oper-
ative and put the parties on the defensive. Many explanations
for such a premium are possible, but few are convincing. Jar-
neen could have taken the occasion of his appointment to pay
off a long overdue $3.45-million Rikling debt. Or perhaps ex-
press the depth of his respect and regard for Mr. Rikling in a
gracious gift in a similar amount. Either of these-debt pay-
ment, gracious gift-could for some valid reason, or pure for-
tuity, accompany the transfer of control, and thus rebut the
presumption. But fortunately for the instant investigation-
since such an analysis belongs elsewheren' 6-- no such bald bonus
has intruded into the hypothetical facts. For the present, there-
fore, the single unencumbered control transfer/stock sale stands
alone for scrutiny. No dollars other than the price for the stock
need disturb the concentration.
OVERVALUATION: A PRmMium-BRIBE
With the control transfer and the stock sale all alone in the
spotlight, the looming importance of the evaluation takes its
proper perspective. Absolutely the only money involved is
the $13 million Jarneen paid Rikling for the stock. No spurious
bonuses-debt, gift or whatever-cloud the issue. Any chicanery
that might be afoot, therefore, must lurk in these stock-sale dol-
lars, or it is nowhere. If a premium-bribe is to be laid at the
Rikling-Jarneen doorstep, it can be found in only one place, the
amount fixed as the investment value-was there contr6leur
increment or rather even decrement?-of the "control" block.
114. See McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899), Porter
v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914), Gabriel Indus., Inc. v. Defiance
Indus., Inc., 151 N.Y.L.J. 13, col. 8 (Sup. Ct. June 17, 1964).
115. Bayne, The Definition of Corporate Control, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J.
445, 507-15 et seq. (1965).
116. Id.
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With this comes the crux. An overvaluation, however little
or much, becomes necessarily a bald premium-bribe paid by
Jarneen to Rikling for his appointment to the office of control.
"Overvaluation" by definition denotes the deliberate appraisal
of a saleable object at a figure over its true value. Such an
appraisal entails perforce the purposeful attribution of dollars in
excess of honest worth. Any such dolars, therefore, beyond the
value of the stock by inexorable logic have no connection with
the stock. They represent money passing from appointee to in-
cumbent with no justifiable relation to the stock sale.
Since the Rikling-Jarneen deal is indivisible, any excess
dollars not referable to the stock value are willy-nilly refer-
able to the control transfer. No other explanation is possible.
Unless, of course, one wishes to indulge in the overdue-debt,
gracious-gift gambit (But then why secrete the debt or gift in
the stock value?). The same inexorable logic would then de-
scribe, equally necessarily, such excess dollars in only one way:
The price to be paid for control, the primitive premium-bribe.
With this the circle is complete. Even the slightest, de-
liberate overvaluation satisfies by that very act the five requisites
of the illicit premium-bribe. Here ummistakably would be (1)
palpable consideration (2) destined to flow from would-be con-
tr6leur Jarneen to (3) incumbent Rikling (4) to induce the
appointment-since no other explanation was proffered-to the
office of control of MRST. As astute businessmen both Rikling
and Jarneen (5) knew full well, scienter, what they were doing.
TRtAFFIc IN THE TRUST
Concede for the moment that two such putative contr6leurs
did deliberately overvalue the "control" block in order thus to
camouflage a $3.45-million 1 7 sale of control. Carry out this
assumption, strictly arguendo, to its logical limits. Would such
a control sale, particularly the overvaluation deeply embedded
in the deal, be the official act of two corporate agents per-
formed pursuant to their contr6leur duties, or a completely inde-
pendent transaction between two private parties acting in their
own personal capacities? Would that control-transfer/stock-sale
exchange, and the overpricing essential to it, be a proper-here
117. Recall that this $3.45 million figure is extremely tentative.
Should later analysis conclude to contr8leur decrement, $3.45 million
would be correspondingly too little.
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improper-function of the trust office, or merely a collateral busi-
ness deal between two individual entrepreneurs?
The sale of control can be disguised behind many masks.
In Laurenzano v. Einbender,118 the premium-bribe was tucked
away in the sale of a subsidiary at "an excessive price."119
In Caplan-Lione12° appointee Sonnabend was prepared to ap-
prove a $75,000 outlay in the form of consultation fees to the
former contr6leur, the Muscat group. In Porter v. Healy,1 21 to
the contrary, all duplicity was eschewed with a naive lump-sum
payment.
Merely because the sale of control hides behind the stock-
investment-value subterfuge in no way alters its essentials. The
very heart of the act remains the conscious transfer of the
custody of the entire trust corpus from incumbent to appointee.
Concomitant, but nonetheless integral, to this transfer is the
payment of a price for the appointment, in this case a price
established by the overestimation of the value of the corpora-
tion as allegedly enhanced by the advent of a Jarneen and the
departure of a Rikling. This overvalued contr6leur increment
or overlooked decrement correspondingly inflates falsely the
price for the "control" stock, thereby passing the premium-bribe.
This bipartite act involves simultaneously and inextricably the
transfer of custody and the personal overvaluation of the entity.
Once one adopts the stock-investment-value ploy as a sale-
of-control device, and the overvaluation thereby becomes a nec-
essary constituent of the premium-bribe. And the premium-
bribe of course is the essence of the sale of control. Victor
Rikling, continuing arguendo, would never have considered the
Jarneen appointment without the prior assurance of the prem-
ium-bribe, and consequently without the overvaluation as the
vehicle to carry the cash. And Norton Jarneen would never
have joined in the overvaluation-and thereby parted with
otherwise unnecessary and unrelated dollars-were not excess
dollars prerequisite to an appointment untrammeled by the un-
comfortable strictures of appointee suitability binding a legiti-
mate transfer of control.
A congeries of related functions, therefore, combines to
produce one indivisible act, the transfer of custody for a price.
As such, this multifaceted act-the mock valuation of the stock,
118. Bayne, supra note 115, at 503.
119. Id.
120. 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1964).
121. 244 Pa. 427, 91A. 428 (1914).
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the payment of the premium-bribe, -and the sale of control-is
the most important of all official corporate transactions. Here
are two strict trustees performing a complex but single cor-
porate act, in their official capacities, on corporate time, for the
avowed good of all, pursuant to the mandates of their office,
and involving directly the entire trust corpus, the corporate
entity. This sale of control is not a strictly private matter be-
tween two independent businessmen, and therefore regulated
by the loose rules of the marketplace. Rather such transfer
of custody is subject in all its details to the utmost stringen-
cies of trust law, particularly the benefit-to-beneficiary and no-
inquiry rules. The sale of control, -through overvalued stock,
is truly trafficking in trust assets, and is governed accordingly.
Were one, therefore, to indulge in the supposition of a purpose-
ful overvaluation to effect a premium-bribe, the result would
necessarily be traffic in the trust, and the consequent imposition
of strict trust rules.
One might argue that the overvaluation alone is essential to
trafficking in the trust, that an exactly correct evaluation would
remove the premium-bribe and the corresponding sale of con-
trol, that a mere sale of stock, divorced completely from the
transfer of custody, would remove the applicability of the trust
rules. This is specious. The two form a moral unit. Even if
divination-and certainly no human agency could work the won-
der-could reveal nothing but contr6leur increment in the dol-
lars for the stock, the concatenation of stock sale and custody
transfer would produce the integral act of traffic in trust assets.
Note well, moreover, that all tids is not airy persiflage.
These benefit-to-beneficiary and no-inquiry rules bind grim and
specific application to the ad hoc situat.on at hand. Such possible
contr6leurs are not strict trustees in a vague academic sense,
bound by ivory-tower generalities. They are face to face with
exact rules geared to a highly particul[ar trust context: A sham
overvaluation in order to buy custody of a corporation.
CONFLICT OF IN T
In its broadest statement the custodial concept of corporate
control stipulates that a corporate steward guard, guide and
nurture the beneficiaries' assets without benefit to self. In his
month-to-month, year-to-year administration the contr6leur must
strive for the best possible corporation in terms of management,
corporate structure, personnel. If possible, a contrleur's duties
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heighten at that critical second when he entrusts the entity to
a new steward. If ever, then does the benefit-to-beneficiary
rule come into play. But more to the point, when a licit control
transfer is transformed into an illegitimate sale for a price mea-
sured in overvalued stock, the benefit-to-beneficiary rule cor-
respondingly adapts to the occasion.
Faced with the twin possibility of (1) diversion of illicit dol-
lars from the corporate till, and (2) the appointment of an un-
suitable contr6leur, the corporate custodian finds his obligation
triply specified: (1) He must be a vigilant representative of the
beneficiaries' interest. (2) His representation must extend to all
without exception. (3) The utmost impartiality must be his
rule. The contr6leur has been entrusted with "other people's
money." Although he may hold 13 percent of the entity him-
self, as did Rikling, he nonetheless must represent the "other" 87
percent with the same evenhandedness as his own. This 87 per-
cent, or 100 percent, or 0.01 percent-even the mite is much to
the widow-is entitled to equally impartial treatment.
Yet at this trust-charged instant the two custodians are
locked in an excoriating conflict of interest. Behind closed
doors is the bargaining table. At one end sit a Rikling and Jar-
neen, two strict trustees, avowedly dedicated only to the stock-
holders' interest. At the far other end sit two level-eyed en-
trepreneurs, the same Rikling and Jarneen (If Pooh Bah could
do it, why not they?) impelled by only one personal desire: To
extract the best possible deal from themselves as trustees. With
an eye to the dollar these two gentlemen as astute businessmen
wish only to outmaneuver themselves as custodians. The in-
terests are antipolar. But wherein lies the substance of the con-
flict? What, for example, would a Rikling and Jarneen want that
would be so inimical to the 87-percent public?
TnE PuBic INERsTs
Were the MRST minority represented at the bargaining table
their desires would have been simple indeed, reducibly twofold:
(1) The elimination of a premium-bribe (say $3.45 million? Or
more?) by means of an honest stock evaluation, and (2) The
appointment of a suitable contr6leur (say a Jarneen?).
Since any overpricing of the stock becomes eo ipso a prem-
ium-bribe, and since the premium-bribe money goes invariably
into the pocket of the incumbent contr6leur (when it rightly
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
belongs to all equally122), the minority 87 percent wants above
all a very vigilant eye at the valuation. Every extra dollar is
simply larceny from the corporate safe. To the contrary, if the
stock valuation is correct, no premium-bribe will pass and
the shareholders are cheated of nothing. Here is the benefit-to-
beneficiary rule in elementary application: No premium bribe
dollars may pass to trustees at the expense of beneficiaries.
Such illicit cash is one of the coconstituents of the triple turpi-
tude of the premium-bribe. Were the public minority, therefore,
assured of impartial scrutiny of the dollar assessment of the
stock, half their wishes would be met.
But more than half the battle would be won for the minority
if impartial evaluators succeed in eliminating the premium-bribe.
Without the inducement of premium-bribe dollars the deliberate
appointment of an unsuitable contr6leur is understandably
unlikely. Remove the pressure of possible overpricing, even to
the extent of $3.45 million or beyond, and Victor Rikling would
assay the suitability of his appointee with an eye single to per-
sonal qualifications. Obviously and necessarily the premium-
briber would thereby be eliminated from contention for the
office. The readiness-perhaps indicative of a propensity123 -to
premium-bribe his way into control is a principal element of
the unsuitability of any prospective contr6leur. This very act
of premium-bribery would seem to disqualify any candidate for
the custody of others' assets.
The addition, moreover, of prem.ium-bribe-induced unsuit-
ability to the illicit cash would supply the second constituent
of the triple turpitude of the premium-bribe. The third requi-
site would come with the appointment itself. Thus use of over-
valued stock to conceal the cash does not create any new species
of premium-bribe. The result is the same tripartite illegitimacy
which "could be described as (1) the perversion of the judgment
of the incumbent contr6leur, engendered by an appointment of
a successor induced by a cause other than suitability, (2) that is,
for consideration illicit in itself, (3) resulting in the appointment
of a candidate unsuitable by reason of his own active role in the
inducement."'124
Once, however, the impartial scrutiny of a third party fore-
122. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Disposition, 57
CAnr_. L. REv. 615 (1969).
123. It is further submitted that a premium-briber generally re-
coups his outlay at the expense of the corporation.
124. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control, supra note 76, at 222.
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stalls a premium-bribe, the assumption is justified that the in-
cumbent contr6leur is trustworthy enough to adhere closely to
the fivefold norm of successor suitability: "(1) moral integrity;
(2) intellectual competence; (3) managerial and organizational
proficiency; (4) social suitability; and (5) satisfactory age and
health."1 25
THE CONFmCTING NTmmSTS
Set off against these legitimate shareholder expectations are
the deeply antagonistic goals of the trustees-turned-entrepre-
neurs. When two such competing entrepreneurs join battle over
the amount of the premium-bribe lodged in the stock valuation,
neither battler is worrying about the public minority.
Of the two, perhaps the conflict of interest is more glaring
in the incumbent contr6leur. After a Rikling has decided to
sell the office for overpriced stock, he obviously will fight ten-
aciously-else why enter the arena in the beginning?-for the
highest possible overpricing. With the market at 16 to 20, why
should a Rikling settle for 22 if he can force the bid to 25 (or
26.5 as Val Florian did)? For the premium-bribed, the top dol-
lar is the only sensible course.
With this approach, one might think the seller is the primary,
even the sole, villain in the script. After all, he not only selected
the successor but he sold the office. Perhaps even pushed the
matter, since he exacted the premium-bribe. Most of all, he has
actually pocketed the putative premium-bribe, possibly even
more than the $3.45 million. To the contrary, in an arm's-length
negotiation between two hard-headed entrepreneurs the prevail-
ing assumption would cast both in the identical roles of equals,
one as able to take care of himself as the other. The success of
such a deal postulates mutual agreement. It takes two consenting
parties to make a bilateral contract. Even more, the would-be
contr6leur is the active party. He wanted the office. He would
do the premium-bribing, and might well have been the insti-
gator. European Import Companies wanted steel (MRST), iron
ore and ships (Chicago-Slopes) to fill out the pattern for "the
development of a total system for the domestic and international
transportation and distribution of freight."' 26 This was, after all,
"transition year plus one"' 27 for European Import. Thus a Jar-
125. Bayne, The Sale of Corporate Control, 33 FoRDHAm L. REV.
583, 593 (1965).
126. European Import Companies, Inc. Annual Report, at 3 (1968).
127. Id. at 1.
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neen will pay a Rikling or a Florian whatever it takes to buy
control, especially since premium-bribe dollars obviate any in-
quiry into suitability. Not that unsuitability is the objective, but
at least suitability is not the sole norm. This is the prevailing
point for Jarneen. No need now to buy more stock. Or get the
approbation of 51 percent of the owners. Dollars not merit are
now the issue. If merit alone were involved, Rikling would never
demand overvalued dollars, or would Jarneen think of paying
them. On merit alone Jarneen never would have gotten the job.
Else why the overpayment? Rikling obviously wanted more
than Jarneen, or his talents. And Jarneen wanted less than
the shareholder scrutiny in a democratic election. Reflection re-
veals that both parties are equally guilty, since both are equally
responsible. Both are strict trustees. One received the money,
but the other passed it. If a Rikling was premium-bribed, a
Jarneen was the premium-briber. Rikling and Jarneen, there-
fore, formed a united front in their amtagonism to the interest
and welfare of the 87 percent. One sought premium-bribe dol-
lars. The other, other than suitability. Toward the minority
they were a single unit of opposition.
To this would come a strong Rikling-Jarneen rebuttal in the
Swan tradition: "Concededly a majority or dominant shareholder
is ordinarily privileged to sell his stock at the best price obtain-
able from the purchaser.' 128 If Rikling is determined to get the
"best price obtainable" and Jarneen the lowest, who is to say
that such an arm's-length struggle is not as objective as any
other competitive market? Jarneen's suitability is beyond ques-
tion. Concededly his appointment on merit alone has been con-
summated. Why must the two delay to seek the bids of others?
Especially since no one knows the product better than Rikling
and Jarneen.
The pitched battle over the investment value is not difficult
to imagine. Riding might begin higher, but probably would
soon settle firmly and finally at 25. In support of his price
he would simply detail Jarneen's proven success in building Euro-
pean Import into an "international transportation"'129 colossus,
with acquisitions and subsidiaries stumbling one over the
other-Regional Materials Services, Western Despatch, Federal
Truckloading, MRST, Chicago-Slopes Iron, Flat Stone Iron
Mines, Bonus Pig, Sea Pond Hatcheries, the Inequity Corporation
128. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 179 (2d Cir. 1955) (Swan.
J., dissenting).
129. European Import Companies, supra note 126.
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and others.130 (In a surge of modesty Rikling might even cite
his own team's recent failures.) Jarneen would be loath to
gainsay the contr6leur increment he would bring to Mythical
Rikling.
But the dollar sign would restore sanity and Jarneen would
counter with the undeniable and pervading presence of the ready
market of the NYSE-some two-million-share turnover in seven
months-at the arresting reality of 18. To pay Rikling 25, or
Florian 26.5 would be abject folly when he could lift the tele-
phone and pay 18. Further, would not such a purchase at 25
be self-damning? Assuredly Mr. Jarneen, or any incoming con-
tr6leur, could have no special predilection for Mr. Rikling's par-
ticular share of stock, especially when they carried a $7 markup.
But before the phone is lifted Rikling presses some equally
arresting facts. Should MRST-plus-Jarneen be really worth 25,
or even 30 as both in their heart know, what of a forceful
derivative suit under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by the mi-
nority, alleging, and justly so, failure to disclose the material
fact of the true value of the public's shares enhanced by the
Jarneen contr6leur increment? The litigation expense alone
would eat up the saving, and recovery besides would not be un-
thinkable. In the same vein, Rikling evidences a tendency to
jump the gun with an early announcement of the appointment,
and watch the market go to 30 before Jarneen can buy. Jar-
neen reconsiders. With these possibilities 25 looks persuasive,
as does section 10 (b), or a possible 30 or more.
Of course, argues Jarneen, the Jarneen advent might mean
contr6leur decrement, and therefore 15, or even 11-3/4. But the
absurdity of this is apparent to both and the figure is firmed at
25.
This brief interlude, so the argument would go, is exactly
reflective of any arm's-length negotiation between any two bar-
gaining shareholders possessed of inside information of Texas
Gulf Sulphur magnitude. Contr6leur increment may be the
subject of an arm's-length deal. Or contr6leur decrement.
But all this is fantasy. One tends to wander off in a dream-
world of stock-sale negotiations and forget the surrounding real-
ity. These two are not Tom and Dick shareholders dickering over
the price of the stock. If they were, the fantasy would be
130. European Import Companies, Inc. Notice of Special Meeting,
in Lieu of Annual Meeting, of Stockholders, June 11, 1974 (May 9,
1974). This 100-page proxy statement gives a broad conspectus of the
Jarneen empire.
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reality. At this moment these two are contr6leurs, strict trus-
tees, passing control of an $85-million company. They are ne-
gotiating in the real world of a gross conflict of interest. Both
are far more interested in the sale of control than the sale of the
stock. The latter is incidental. Rikling and Jarneen, and Swan
and Lumbard and Pollack, fail to emphasize that the stock
sale can never be fully divorced from the transfer of custody.
At that moment a Rikling can see premium-bribe dollars and a
Jarneen a merit-free, voteless appointment to control. As long as
a control transfer accompanies a stock sale, the stock sale is
necessarily involved in traffic in the tiust.
True, when Rikling and Jarneen sat down together, a knock-
down-and-drag-out battle did ensue. But it was not an open,
arm's-length negotiation between one dogged and impartial in-
vestor and another. To the contrary, one must assume that it
was two tough-minded businessmen hammering out in private the
amount of premium-bribe necessary to buy control of Mythical
Rikling. To Rikling and Jarneen, the overnight contr6leur incre-
ment, with Jarneen in and Rikling out, adding instantaneously
$25 million to the overall worth of the Mythical Rikling Sheet
and Tube Corporation and correspondingly netting Rikling $3.45
million for his "control" block, was an artful ruse. Doubly art-
ful if the increment was actually decrement. Such rather was
the Rikling-Jarneen consensus of the sale value of control to a
ready and willing premium-briber. Stock valuation was in fact
premium-bribe negotiation. Otherwise, why not a competitive
price on a free market?
The Insuranshares court knew what happened: "The buyers
were primarily interested in getting control of the corporation
together with such stock ownership as would make that control
secure and untrammelled, and the sellers were primarily in-
terested in getting as much money as possible for what they had
to sell-both the control and their interest in the assets."131
THE No-INQuIRY RuLE
Note well: The sole subject of this back-room valuation was
a totally unknown entity. Not a soul. had any clear idea of the
value of Mythical Rikling under a Jarneen. No one even sus-
pected the combination was in the offing. True, the cold eye of
the market had calculated Mythical ,ikling under Rikling at an
average 18. But Mythical Rikling-plus-Jarneen was presumably
131. 35 F. Supp. 22, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
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another thing. The contr6leur increment, or decrement, the
differential before and after, was the lone subject of valuation,
and not one person beyond Rikling and Jarneen had even heard
of it.
Next, the valuation itself was strictly ex parte. Behind
closed doors and alone Rikling and Jarneen upped Mythical Rik-
ling's value $25 million, by simply subtracting Rikling and
adding Jarneen. No impartial person-a ready buyer with dollars
in hand-was called in to put a price on the stock without con-
trol. No public announcement asked an objectively competitive
market to evaluate Mythical Rikling-plus-Jarneen. Obviously,
such an evaluation-whether by ready buyer, general market
or even the 87-percent minority-would eliminate any conflict
of interest. No longer would the valuation be that of Rikling and
Jarneen. The competitive evaluation would become their evalu-
ation. In effect this impartial third party would supplant Rik-
ling and Jarneen, acquisitive entrepreneurs, at the bargaining
table. Then Rikling and Jarneen, strict trustees, would be out
of the conflict.
But the doors were never thus opened, and the valuation of
this questionable increment was strictly a private matter. No
outside scrutiny, no current corroboration, no possible double
check. To this add the dedicated devotion to their own interests,
a palpable conflict of interest, and Rikling and Jarneen have set
the scene for the unswerving application of the no-inquiry rule.
Over the decades the Anglo-Saxon law of trusts has gained
some remarkably reliable insights into man's nature and con-
duct. Paramount among these has been the categorical convic-
tion that a fallible human person on both sides of a bargain with
a personal stake in the outcome is essentially incapable of im-
partiality. Centuries of legal wisdom have long since placed such
detached objectivity far beyond the rational powers of homo
rationais. This ultimate principle of human conduct is founded
simply on the consistent fragility of human nature.
Age-old recognition of this basic handicap of acquisitive man
led inevitably to the formal enunciation of the so-called no-
inquiry rule:
The law of trusts has been unrelentingly adamant in the auto-
matic disqualification from any attempt to represent both sides
in an adversary negotiation of any single person with a per-
sonal interest in one side. So unremitting is the prohibition
that the courts will not even initiate an inquiry into the result.
The absolute inflexibility of the no-inquiry rule is amply
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justified by the fusion of two separate factors: (1) The private
evaluation of a wholly unknown subject with no independent cor-
roboration, (2) by a single person with interests deeply in con-
flict with those of the absent party. Understandably the result
is automatic disqualification.
Further reflection can penetrate more deeply into the ration-
ale of the no-inquiry rule. When a Rikling and Jarneen, trus-
tees-turned-entrepreneurs and hence a unitary "person," per-
sonally priced a new entity-MRST -with Jarneen-without the
check of a free market, the result could be high of the mark, or
low, or exactly reflect true value. From the strictly factual
standpoint, Rikling and Jarneen could stoutly stand by $25 mil-
lion in contr6leur increment, whereas detractors among the pub-
lic minority could argue vociferously that the transition from
Rikling to Jarneen was rather a contr6leur decrement of $25
million (witness a year later), that Jarneen was far from a Breech,
Townsend or Chapin. But both claims are equally irrelevant.
The nub is the intrinsic incompetency of a Jarneen to set a value
on Jarneen, especially with help from a Rikling who wants the
highest dollar. Whether high, low or exactly correct, therefore,
is not the point. The real crux is twofold: (1) The ever-present
possibility of overvaluation, and (2) The utter impossibility of
knowing what the correct value might have been. The com-
plete absence of a free-market countercheck plus the proven
conflict-of-interest compulsion render the chance of overvalua-
tion invariable. In the light of the cupidity of humankind such
possibility is rather likelihood.
With such inescapable possibility--even likelihood-and the
inability to ever know, the law is forced to regard such over-
valuation as a certainty. Since the law can never depend on the
absence of overvaluation, it must always assume its presence.
A necessarily possible overvaluation must be viewed legally as
an actuality. The conclusion: All private conflict-of-interest
valuations are legal overvaluations, and must be treated as such
in their legal consequences.
Such personal price-setting, then, is necessarily reprobate;
not extrinsically because the figure could be correct (some con-
tr6leur increment could well be present), but intrinsically be-
cause of the innate, conflict-of-interest disability and the postu-
lated rejection of a competitive countercheck. The right itself
is impugned, not the possible correctness of the evaluation. Any
unsupervised valuation by partial parties necessarily becomes
at law an overvaluation.
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All this explains the assumption throughout that Rikling
and Jarneen overvalued. Now at long last the validity, and neces-
sity, of that irritating and long-prolonged "assumption strictly ar-
guendo" of a Rikling-Jarneen mock valuation should be apparent.
Such assumption is unavoidable, albeit regrettable, as long as
partial parties insist on ignoring the independent market. What
began as an assumption must end as a fact. Only thus can the
law of trusts protect the helpless beneficiaries.
The view from the textbooks always left the no-inquiry rule
looking harsh and unnecessarily unremitting. In the abstract,
some concession seemed in order. But its applicability becomes
vivid when a Rikling and Jarneen sit all alone pricing Mythical
Rikling-plus-Jarneen at a figure personally congenial to both
and smacking of a sale of control.
Thus the last of the several factors has been proven. As
proven it joins with the others to prove the proposition originally
set for proof:
At the time of the transfer of control and the sale of the
"control" stock inter se, a personal evaluation of that stock-
whether correct or not-by the two contr6leurs, incumbent and
appointee, is intrinsically reprobate under the benefit-to-bene-ficiary and no-inquiry rules, since both contr6leurs are acting
throughout as strict trustees of the entity.
Here then is the essential ineligibility, the necessary dis-
qualification, of the trustees-turned-entrepreneurs. The no-
inquiry rule interdicts absolutely any independent evaluation
and sale.
But if Rikling and Jarneen are forever precluded from a
private estimate, what to do? Is any sale possible? If so, how
best?
(III) THE SOLUTION: THE TENDER OFFER
Victor Rikling was determined to resign. Painstaking re-
search had produced a successor eminently suitable for the
stewardship of Mythical Rikling. Norton Jarneen had acceded to
the selection and was prepared to dedicate himself absolutely to
the bonum commune of the corporation. The board change-
over was settled. Mr. Rikling also felt, as Mr. Weyenberg be-
fore him, that the best interests of all, including Mythical Rik-
ling, suggested that he unload his entire interest and quit the
field completely. Besides, he was tired. And he wanted cash
for his stock. So too did Val Florian.
Norton Jarneen on his part-better than any conscious of
1305
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
his own capabilities-had estimated the value of his own per-
sonal contribution to the firm at $7 per share. He was convinced
that the contrleur increment with Jarneen in and Rikling out
was approximately $25 million in all. More to the point Mr. Jar-
neen felt, as Mr. Florsheim before him, that a substantial stake
in Mythical Rikling would give him greater incentive toward
diligence and productivity. His current financial state indicated
a 13-percent interest as feasible. He was determined to buy.
Both Mr. Rikling and Mr. Jarneen had only one all-perva-
sive consideration-the selection of a most suitable successor to the
office of control. Certainly, no thought of a sale of control or a
premium-bribe ever entered their heads. If, incidentally, Mr.
Jarneen could also purchase a 13-percent block at $25, all the
better.
With both determined, one to sell, the other buy, several
powerful impulses tortured them. How to rein in these forces,
and still effect the sale and purchase to the satisfaction of both?
In the first place, Victor Rikling was frank to admit that he
was not about to "perpetrate a Weyenberg" and sell at a mar-
ket 18. And certainly he would never admit "contr6leur decre-
ment" to 11 or more. He knew MRST-plus-Jarneen was worth
25. Jarneen had to agree, especially since he saw the real dangers
of a section 10 (b) action if he bought up 525,000 shares at 18 with-
out disclosing his appointment. And a premature announcement
might send the market to 30.
Next, as unlofty as the motive was, neither dared risk even
the accusation of a premium-bribe. In their more moral mo-
ments they knew a private partial valuation came to just that. The
sale/purchase had to avoid that stigma. Straight common sense,
or even gross dollar-and-cents motivation, would send both in-
cumbent and successor headlong to protect their names.
[Oif all the acts of his corporate career the most important
is probably the contr6leur's appointment of a successor, an act
fraught with deep trust implications, determinative of the long-
term future well-being of the corporation. How completely
unthinkable and unlikely for men of prudence to pass un-
related consideration at this time. Even grade-school discretion
would caution a contrary course .... [O]nly a rare trustee
would not heed such grade-school warnings .... 132
The attitude of both Rikling and Jarneen would be colored deeply
by strong desires to remove even the tincture of suspicion.
Finally, both Rikling and Jarneen translated their trust ob-
132. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53
MiNN. L. REv. 485, 510 (1969).
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ligations into a firm desire to give the 87-percent minority an
equal opportunity to share in any sale which would reflect the
contr6leur increment or decrement effected by the advent of
Jarneen.
Impelled by these desires, some altruistic, some selfish, but
all legitimate, Rilding and Jarneen could well have thought of a
way, a reconciliation of all the apparent ambivalence. The so-
lution lay in a flanking operation. Oscar Wilde notwithstanding,
the best way to overcome temptation is to flee it. Had Rik-
ling and Jarneen wished to avoid the stigma of suspicion and the
cries for an explanation, a simple sidestep would have achieved
both. The risk of premium-bribe or section 10(b), the loss of a
just sale or a fair purchase, the inequity of leaving the 87 per-
cent outside, could all be obviated in the simplicity of an un-
cluttered tender offer.
A straightforward letter to all the shareholders over the
signatures of Messrs. Rikling and Jarneen could squarely present
all the facts and factors. The letter could begin with Mr. Rik-
ling's decision to retire, his selection of Mr. Jarneen, a full but
objective list of those Jarneen capabilities so impressive to Mr.
Rikling, and move on to Mr. Jarneen's desire to buy into the
firm. The letter could conclude with a firm Jarneen offer to
purchase at $25 per share-$7 over current market-13 percent
of all outstanding stock prorated equally for all, including, of
course, Mr. Rikling.
Subsequent to the success of the offer and as part of the
plan, Mr. Rikling on his part might possibly take immediate
advantage of the $25 market and sell-in paced sales over the
NYSE-the remaining 87 percent of his original 13-percent
block (but only after he had made up from his own shares
any deficiency in the tenders, thereby assuring Mr. Jarneen of
his full 13 percent). Thus in one simple flanking operation,
Rikling and Jarneen would achieve their every objective, with-
out even a smidgen of suspicion.
TmE OUTGOING CONTR6LEUR
Such a stratagem puts everyone on his mettle-Mr. Rikling
particularly as incumbent contr6leur. His judgment of successor
selection would be subjected to the collective scrutiny of an in-
formed market. If the public shareholders of MRST concurred
in Rilding's judgment of Jarneen's rosy promise, none of the
public 87 percent would sell. Who would run away from a good
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thing? Better keep the stock and ride high with Jarneen.
Thus would Rikling's judgment be vindicated and his original
intentions implemented. He would sell his entire 13-percent
block to Jarneen and reap his full $7 of contr6leur increment.
And he could retire gracefully from the scene exactly according
to plan.
To the contrary, if his vision had been blinded by an un-
founded glamor in Mr. Jarneen, an astute evaluation of Mythical
Rikling under Jarneen would send sell offers pouring in. And
Mr. Rikling, able to sell only 13 percent of 13 percent, would be
forced to live-or die-with 87 percent of his investment in the
stewardship of Jarneen. (Jarneen might well wish to stipulate
that such an event would prompt Rikling to disburse his shares
on the market over an agreed period, and thus remove any dis-
comf6rture Jarneen might feel in having his predecessor too
close at hand.)
If Rikling's estimate was egregiously wrong in the eyes of
the Street, if decrement rather than increment was the correct
word, Mythical Riding would invariably slip back down to the
realistic 18 (or to the 11-3/4 it actually hit about a year after).
With such sobering alternatives before him an incumbent con-
tr6leur would not be hasty in either 'is selection of a successor
or his estimation of contr6leur increment.
THE INcoMINa CoinM6LEUR
Except for the shared expense of the shareholder letter,
such a tender offer should have considerable appeal to Mr. Jar-
neen. Even the relatively slight expense would be amply set
off by the several advantages. First, he has achieved his prime
objective-the opportunity to devote his talents toward the de-
velopment of Mythical Rikling. As a result, his 13-percent block
not only carries the present enhanced value of the contr6leur
increment but the incentive of future appreciation under his
aggressive leadership. Next, Mr. Jarneen certainly cared not a
whit who sold him what particular shares (assuming the stipu-
lation that Rikling later leave, if and when). With no intent of
cheating anyone, he was perfectly ready to pay the fair price of
25-reflecting the legitimate contr6leur increment-to any seller
ready to sell. But most of all, as an incipient trustee, Mr. Jar-
neen wanted to shun all taint of premium-bribery-and danger
of section 10 (b)-so easily done with a -tender offer.
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Tim PUmLic SHREHOLDERS
The scattered minority have everything to gain. Granted,
if the stewardship of Jarneen should go sour-presuming they
held their shares-they would deeply regret Rikling's appoint-
ment. But even this contingency was freely chosen. They could
have opted out, at least partially, at 25. This option to stay in
or sell is far better than the forced acceptance of a new con-
tr6leur. Further, the NYSE might momentarily follow the ten-
der-offer price and the public might sell all their 87 percent at 25.
The tender offer gives the public holders the chance to realize
their $7 contr6leur increment on a prorata basis equal to the out-
going contr6leur. Such a trustee-contr6leur should not enjoy a
favored opportunity to reap an early reward merely because of
his position. This is one of the handicaps of being a custodian.
Even then this handicap only holds the contr6leur to an equal
price. The result is not a penalty, merely a bar to cheating.
The offer was made to Rikling as incumbent contr~leur-trustee
by Jarneen as incipient contr6leur-trustee. Thus does the tender
offer anticipate the rudimentary demands of equity without the
need of postdelictum litigation. As the California Court of Ap-
peals puts it in the 1969 Brown v. Halbert:133
The rule we have adopted here simply is that it is the duty
of the majority stockholder-director, when contemplating the
sale of the majority stock at a price not available to other
stockholders and which sale may prejudice the minority stock-
holders, is to act affirmatively and openly with full disclosure
so that every opportunity is given to obtain substantially the
same advantages that such fiduciary secured and for the full
protection of the minority. 34
The chief advantage to the public, however, lies in the
knowledge that the steward of their assets will exercise every
vigilance in selecting a suitable successor. The built-in safe-
guards will add realistic muscle to the contr6leur's fiducial obli-
gation to represent the dependent beneficiaries-and incidentally
himself-in his successor selection and during an arm's-length
negotiation of the investment price, including the contr6leur in-
crement or decrement. And it would be truly arm's-length with
133. 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969).
134. Id. at 327, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94. This same philosophy of
"equal opportunity" has been produced within various contexts by
several writers. See Jennings, Tradings in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF.
L. REV. 1 (1956); Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Oppor-
tunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARv. L. REv. 505 (1965). The entire
tender-offer approach assumes compliance with both the Williams Act
and Rule 154.
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the free market setting the price. Since the minority are at
the mercy of the contrleur in any event, far better to face the
dangers of a control transfer with an option to bail out than to
sit by and watch control pass to a looter or an incompetent.
With a suitable appointee, moreover, the minority will not feel
the necessity of selling their remaining shares.
This suggested solution is redolent of that Solomonic par-
ental device for sharing the apple: One son cuts, the other
chooses. With such an arrangement--and so too with the tender
offer-the only unhappy party is the avaricious one.
Many possible variants could perhaps improve the plan. The
prospective contrleur could be required to purchase a minimum
of 10- or 15-percent of the corporation. Or perhaps the outgoing
contrleur should not share in any sale to his successor until the
public have tendered all they wish, up to the agreed limit.
But whatever the variant, obviously none of the proposals
need be mandatory, even the tender offer itself. After the pub-
lic announcement of the Jarneen appointment, several paths lay
open. Rikling and Jarneen could have each bought and sold
separately over the NYSE. Or they could have foregone a sale
altogether.
But if Rikling and Jarneen insist on a sale inter se, only one
narrow route is open: The price for the stock must be estab-
lished by a freely competitive market-either general public or
minority tender-with full knowledge of any potential con-
tr6leur increment or, more to the point, decrement that Jarneen
might bring to MRST. The crux? The market for MRST-plus-
Rikling is strictly irrelevant to a new market for MRST with
Jarneen. It may stay at 18, or go to 25, or 26.5, or 30-or drop
to 11.
The ever-present possibility, therefore, of this ready-and-
waiting freely competitive market in the persons of the public
minority pushes the issue to the ultimate: Do the trustee con-
tr6leurs intend the appointment of a suitable successor, accom-
panied incidentally by a legitimate sale and purchase of stock, or
would they prefer a bald sale of control for a handsome prem-
ium-bribe?
But if that straight and narrow path of a tender offer is
eschewed, what then?
(IV) THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF A SALE
Were a court faced with a consummated sale along the lines
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of the Mythical Rikling hypothetical, the devious path of rea-
soning so painfully elaborated thus far should point the way to
a plausible adjudication.
The first step would strip away the camouflage that hid the
traditional old-line premium-bribe. Underneath lay the blunt
£75 slipped under the table in Sugden v. Crossland,'3" the almost
gauche $15,000 Levy handed McClure,1386 the naive sale of control
from Cohn to Muscat to Sonnabend for $135,000 in straight cash
in Caplan-Lionet.37  The only difference? The dollars wore a
different garb, and could barely be recognized in the "true invest-
ment value" of the stock.
To begin, the court would juxtapose (1) The transfer of
custody of MRST from Rikling to Jarneen, against (2) The pri-
vate sale at 25 by partial parties of an unknown entity, MRST-
plus-Jarneen, untested, and never to be tested, by a free market,
with not a thought of the 87-percent minority or any competitive
bid. How remarkable that Rikling and Jarneen should choose
the occasion of this most delicate act of their tenure for the sale
of such a block at a price unconfirmed and unconfirmable.
In the face of such conflict of interest the no-inquiry rule
would become immediately operative. How much of the $13-
million sale figure was pure premium-bribe? Was there con-
tr6leur increment? Or decrement? No one would or could ever
know. At the time of the actual sale no disinterested dollars
were asked to bid against the partial price of 25. With that
moment gone forever, steel shortages or steel glut, Viet Nam
hopes or scares, franc devaluations or mark avvaluations, the
baneful effects of inflation, the inflationary potential of SDRs-
and, of course, the actual impact of Jarneen on Mythical Rikling
-could send the market skyrocketing to 40, or plummeting, as it
later did, to 11. All the paid appraisers in the world, with their
own dollars inside their pockets, can never adequately recon-
struct the true investment value of MRST shares as of March
26, 1973. The Wall Street Journal put it well in praising the Ger-
man move to a free-floating mark:
The problem is: What is the mark worth? Instead of
closeting some financial wizards to dream up the answer in a
vacuum, the Bonn government chose to let the market decide.
Specifically, it will permit the dollar-mark exchange rate to
find its own level .... 138
135. 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (Ch. 1856).
136. 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
137. 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1964).
138. The Wall Street Journal, Editorial, Oct. 1, 1969, at 8, col. 1.
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In the end, then, a court would have no other choice: Secret
traffic in the trust rendered the true value of the shares un-
known and unknowable.
THE AMOUNT OF THE PREMIum-BRIB:
At this juncture, therefore, the court would face the neces-
sary chore: How determine the dollar amount of those shares?
Jarneen chose to pay, and Rikling accept, 25, Florian, 26.5, in se-
cret deals. After the open market absorbed the news of the
Jarneen takeover, what was the available price? The dollar
differential between price paid and price available will deter-
mine the amount of the premium-brib e.
But to say "dollar differential" only begins the chore. Dol-
lar differential for whom? Were Rikling to have hunted an im-
partial buyer for his 525,000 shares, he would have cautiously
sold on the Big Board over several months. He might have
gotten as high as 27. Jarneen, however, would have been just as
cautious and might have bought at 11. Whose efforts, Rikling's
or Jarneen's, are to set the market price against the 25 actually
paid? Rikling exacted the premium-bribe, but Jarneen was the
premium-briber. Regardless of who is to be the protagonist,
what conjectural price is to govern? The highest for Rikling?
The lowest for Jarneen? In between?
Since two strict trustees saw fit to place themselves in a clear
conflict with beneficiaries' interests, since both rejected the
ready opportunity to get the best deal at competitive prices in
a free market, since both refused at the proper time to establish
the true dollar value of the stock, -they cannot now complain
when the court is forced to set the figure for them. Only thus
can the law protect the neglected beneficiaries. In such an
after-the-fact situation the court is willy-nilly hamstrung. It
alone must find the price. More to the point, as between active
malefactors and injured victims the court has little choice. The
law must select that stock-price figure most favorable to the
impotent minority and least so to the contr6leurs who con-
cocted the deal and spurned an impartial price at the time.
Learned Hand faced a similar problem in Gratz v. Claughton18 9
in 1951: How to determine the profits in short-swing dealings
when many sales and many purchases could not be matched
with certainty.
The situation falls within the doctrine which has been law since
139. 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
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the days of the "Chimney Sweeper's Jewel Case" [Armory v.
Delamirie, 1722, 1 Strange 505] that when damages are at some
unascertainable amount below an upper limit and when the un-
certainty arises from the defendants' wrong, the upper limit will
be taken as the proper amount.140
Learned Hand-and any court, it is submitted-would decide the
instant question the same way. The only legal assumption avail-
able: The premium-bribe base would be the lowest price pos-
sible-within a reasonable time after the announcement of the
appointment. Further, a Rikling-Jarneen court would in fact
have an "ascertainable amount:" the best buy an energetic and
dollar-minded Jarneen could find.
Not only must the court select the "upper limit ... as the
proper amount," but the time span for the purchase must ex-
tend as long as a reasonable buyer would wait. Nothing com-
pelled Jarneen to buy privately on March 26. Had he or Rikling
wanted immediate action a public deal or a tender offer was
available. Jarneen could have spread his purchases over six
months to a year, or longer, watching the market for the most
favorable moment. Next to the tender offer itself the surest
showing of honesty would have been just such a calculated delay
till the objective market evaluated MRST-plus-Jarneen. In short,
any "uncertainty [arose] from the defendants' wrong."
Thus the handicap the two contr6leurs assumed in refusing
a free competitive offer would send the court to the lowest
feasible figure within a reasonable time of the transaction.
Such search would not be difficult. Roughly a year after the
March 26 sale the market hovered for some time in the 13s, even
hitting 11-3/4. On this basis the hypothetical $7 would un-
doubtedly be supplanted by a more realistic $12. For Val Flor-
ian, $13.5. Consequently the Rikling premium-bribe would be
$6.3 million. For Florian, $3 million. Total: $9.3 million.
This rationale would eliminate any discussion of blockage,
which warrants little consideration in any event. Blockage is
ambivalent and could well cancel itself out. Every sale is a
purchase and every purchase a sale, and each affects the market
equally. Jarneen, therefore, simply needed time and deftness.
The 9.3-million MRST shares outstanding, plus a two-million-
share volume in the seven-month period ending March 26, 1973,
should settle the matter.
THE ILL=GALITY OF THE PREMInM
The determination of the free-market figure for Jarneen's
140. 187 F.2d at 51-52.
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purchase should not unduly occupy a court, and from this point
forward precedents governing premium-bribe illegality abound.
True, even with a proven premium-bribe-its existence estab-
lished and amount determined-the courts are still split about
50-50. But guidelines are emerging, and the answers have been
attempted in considerable detail. 4 :  Respectable authority-
Sugden, McClure, Bosworth v. Allen,142 Porter v. Healy,143 Perl-
man v. Feldmann,144 Caplan-Lione,,145 Ferraioli v. Cantor146
and most recently the 1969 Brown v. Halbert 47 and Jones v.
Ahmanson 48 have ordered over the premium-bribe to the cor-
poration. At this late date the question should be closed: The
1968 Porco149 and the 1969 Painterc were wrong. The "prem-
ium" for the sale of control is illegal, and belongs to the corpo-
ration.
THE DISPOSITION
But once awarded to the corporation, how would the $9.3
million be distributed? May 19.3-percent stockholder Jarneen
share in the "windfall?" Must Rikling and Florian disgorge the
total $9.3 million, or only the 87-percent public's share? These
extremely subtle questions have received almost total neglect
at the hands of both court and commentator.151 In fact the
Second Circuit, in Perlman v. Feldmann, is the only court to
advert directly to the problem posed by the disposition of the
premium-bribe. Feldmann righteously refused-albeit with-
out support of precedent or reason-to let premium-briber Wil-
port, now with a third of Newport Steel, share in the $2.1
million ostensibly destined for the corporate treasury, even
though its stock purchase (without the premium) from Feld-
mann was perfectly legitimate. On the other hand the court,
mirabile dictu, allowed premium-bribed Feldmann to keep a
third of the premium-bribe he received for selling control of
141. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic Illegiti-
macy, 47 TEXAS L. Rnv. 215 (1969).
142. 168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E. 163 (1901).
143. 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914).
144. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
145. 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1964).
146. 281 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
147. 271 Cal. App. 2d 307, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969).
148. Jones v. Ahmanson, - Cal. App. 2d - (1969).
149. Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
150. 418 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1969).
151. Bayne, supra note 122.
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Newport. To the contrary, the Caplan-Lionel court never men-
tioned the problem, and permitted Sonnabend's three percent
to share in the $135,000 he originally paid to premium-bribe
Muscat.
The Rikling-Jarneen hypothetical is of course on all fours
with Feldmann and Caplan-Lionel. The small share of Sonna-
bend may have escaped the court, but the Jarneen 13 percent
-19.3 percent, with Val Florian's sale-would loom almost as
large as the Feldmann-Wilport third. As between premium-
bribed Feldmann and premium-briber Wilport why Feldmann
favored Feldmann one will never know. The court's error is
probably referable to its earlier error: No attempt was made to
mulct civil damages from Wilport for its breach of trust in buying
control of Newport Steel. Further, no criminal prosecutions
were pressed against Wilport for commercial bribery.152  Civil
damages and criminal fines, if not imprisonment-to say nothing
of its "loss" of the $2.1 million-would have completely cleansed
Wilport of culpability. With its triple debt paid, no court would
further bar Wilport personally from its just share in the corpora-
tion. As to the stock itself, it was hardly tainted, since the sale
of a valuable commodity at an honest price was fully severable
from the turpitude of the premium-bribe. Such reasoning should
permit Wilport-and an analogous Jarneen-to enjoy the bene-
fits of the entire award to the corporation. As for a Rikling, he
too would be mulcted in civil damages, fined, even imprisoned,
for commercial-bribe receiving,153 and possibly for larceny by em-
bezzlement. 154 Thus both would seemingly be equally purged.
The upshot would find Rikling and Florian with their $9.3 mil-
lion disgorged, Jarneen without his original $9.3 million but still
holding the purchased 19.3 percent.
THE OFFIcE OF CoN6RLEuR
But what of control of Mythical Rikling? Rikling, guilty of
premium-bribery and breach of trust, convicted of assorted
crimes, would certainly never be restored to his original con-
trol position. Correspondingly, Jarneen equally proved his un-
suitability by covering himself with the triple turpitude of prem-
ium-bribery. The civil damages, criminal fines, loss of the $9.3
152. E.g., in New York: See N.Y. Pen. Law § 180.00 (McKinney
1967).
153. See, e.g., N.Y. Pen. Law § 180.05 (McKinney 1967).
154. See, e.g., N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 60.10-2(d), 70.15-2 (McKinney
1967).
1315
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
million, all are resultant on his active role in effecting the
tripartite illegitimacy of the premium-bribe:
(1) the perversion of the judgment of the incumbent contrleur,
engendered by an appointment of a successor induced by a
cause other than suitability, (2) that is, for consideration illicit
in itself, (3) resulting in the appointment of a candidate un-
suitable by reason of his own active role in the inducement.155
Jarneen consciously set about (1) to pervert Rikling's judgment,
(2) with illicit cash and (3) thereby foist a premium-briber on
MRST. His removal is foregone and simple. With him, of
course, would go his entire team, all those directors who exe-
cuted the takeover.
The stock sales had the full approval (if the companies in which
Mr. Rikling and Mr. Weakly had their interests ... and these
companies welcome the chance of tying up with a major im-
port/transport enterprise.156
But the implementation of that removal carries the real prob-
lems: (1) How elect his successor? (2) And keep him elec-
ted? What of the 19.3-percent Jarneen block? The astute
Lionel court in 1964 faced its Jarneen-and the identical prob-
lems-in the senior Sonnabend, now deceased. A. N. Son-
nabend not only bought control of Lionel for $135,000 but
was prepared to sweeten the premium-bribe with $75,000 in
postresignation salaries and consultation fees for the selling con-
tr6leur Muscat. More than that, Sonnabend was about to un-
leash several "dogs" on Lionel, notabl.y Mad, from his Premier
Corporation. With Sonnabend incumbent a new election
would find the sheepish proxies putting Sonnabend right back
into office. "Therefore, some restrictions of the present board
are required, so that the Sonnabend group may not take ad-
vantage of the position they hold.'"57  The New York court
handled the matter in a most enlightened way (Subsurface of
course was an unexpressed impugning of the outmoded "demo-
cratic" processes of the widely-held annual meeting):
They shall be restricted to current management problems and
other matters necessary for the proper functioning of the cor-
poration and they shall not be permitted to use their present of-
fices as the means to secure stockholder approval for their
designated directorial slate, or deal in matters involving self-
interest, such as proposed acquisitions from Premier Corporation
of America.158
The 87-percent public minority shareholders of Mythical Rikling
are in exactly the same fix as the 97 percent of Lionel.
155. Bayne, supra note 141, at 222.
156. The Wall Street Revriew, Mar. 27, 1968, at 4, col. 1.
157. Matter of Lionel Corp., 151 N.Y.L.J. 14, col. 3, at coL 6 (1964).
158. Id.
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It would appear the interests of all of the corporate body
politic require that some method be evolved so that the holders
of the other 97% of the corporate stock be given an opportunity
to express and disseminate their views and suggestions and take
whatever appropriate action they wish to with respect to both
the future management of the corporation and the acquisition
proposals which are about to be submitted to them. In other
words, what is called for is some neutralizing element which
will see to it that no undue advantage is arrogated to it by the
current group and that other groups which may form will have
an opportunity to take such action in the premises as they deem
advisable.159
The "neutralization" of the Sonnabend-Jarneen power "po-
sition" could be approached on two fronts: (1) The share dis-
persal, and (2) domination of the proxy-solicitation mechanism.
The former seemed beyond change, so the Lionel court "neutral-
ized" the latter.
In some jurisdictions the device of a Master in Chancery to
supervise the election has been utilized for such purpose [cita-
tions]. In this and other States there have been instances of
the appointment of a referee to perform like functions [cita-
tions]. Even within the confining limits of former section 25
of the General Corporation Law, a New York court recently
designated such a supervisor under similar circumstances [cita-
tions] .160
Of course, the New York court was not truly circumscribed by
"the confining limits of former section 25" and did not need to
rely on the new section 619 which "empowers the court to 'take
such other action as justice may require' in the premises."'161
Since these are merely statutory enunciations of the broad equit-
able power possessed by every chancellor since the early 1300s,
an equity court therefore could readily emulate New York:
The court, in order to take such action as "justice may re-
quire" must assure the use of the corporate proxy machinery
for the best interests of all the stockholders of the corpora-
tion. To this end the court will designate a referee on the order
to be entered herein. The said referee will perform such acts
as may be necessary to effectuate the decision of the court.162
With this the matter would seem to be closed. But what of
the foreboding presence of the Jarneen 19.3-percent block brood-
ing over new MRST contr6leur-assuming, of course, a new
man-at every succeeding meeting over the coming years? Here
an equity court could perhaps take a page from the Govern-
ment's book in its unraveling of the knotty Du Pont-General
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Motors antitrust problem.1 3 A forced sale can be decently done.
Du Pont was able to disburse 63-million shares of General
Motors'6 without apparent damage. After all, two million
shares of Mythical Rikling changed hands in a short seven
months in 1972-73. Old man Weyenberg's successful secondary
offer of Weyenberg Shoe unloaded in a day 222,725 shares at a
not dishonest price on a free market. In November 1969, Cities
Service announced the distribution to its own shareholders of
1.8- (of 2.3-) million shares of Atlantic Richfield "under a consent
decree with the Justice Department. ' ' 6 5 Thus a negotiated plan
of disbursal spread over five years and subject to the scrutiny of
a court-appointed referee could adequately remove the Jarneen
threat for the future, and do Jarneen no more harm than he
deserves.
The Mythical Rikling hypothetical came along at a very
appropriate day toward the elucidation of the most complex of
the sale-of-control problems. No longer should "true invest-
ment value" successfully disguise a raw premium-bribe.
163. United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316
(1961).
164. Id.
165. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 4. 1969, at 12, col. 2. A cor-
oration, such as Cities Service, has a ready recipient for any such dis-
tribution, and also a ready quid for the quo, Cities Service shares. In
point of fact, European Import Companies holds the MRST shares, not
Norton Jarneen personally. Which leads to the further thought of EIC-
shareholder reaction to the loss of some $10 million referable to the
purchase of MRST control.
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